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My dissertation studies how financial frictions affect economy, especially 
macroeconomy.  
Chapter 2 studies the potential for rational bubbles in the innovation sector to affect 
long term economic growth. We show that stock market prices of R&D firms could include a 
bubble component when credit constraints are present. Bubbles are self-sustained in 
equilibrium by a "liquidity" premium that originates when credit constraints are relaxed. 
Bubbles expand borrowing and production capacity of R&D firms, stimulate innovation and 
increase the growth rate. Bubbles are magnified by tighter credit constraints and scarce 
investment opportunities. Finally, we show that bubbles can create permanent reallocation 
effects benefiting the innovation sector over other sectors. 
Chapter 3 uses a generalized Kiyotaki and Moore model (1997) with collateral and 
cash-in-advance constraints to study the effects of financial and non-financial crisis and the 
effects of monetary policy both in the short and the long run. We then characterize optimal 
monetary policy in the Ramsey sense. We find that in the long run, the optimal monetary policy 
drives the social, but not the individual, shadow price of the collateral constraint to zero. This 
translates into a generalized version of the Friedman's rule, one that takes into account the 
degree of credit tightening. In the short run, optimal monetary policy is counter-cyclical, 
significantly offsetting the effects of financial shocks and reducing the welfare loss of the 
shocks. 
Chapter 4 studies the dynamics of blockchain innovation, adoption and competition in 
the global payment industry in the presence of a traditional technology. We build a theoretical 
model with network effects to study the possible evolution path of the payments industry, how 
a particular technology can gain and lose its market share and whether there exist some 
vii 
 
technology which can maintain its dominant power. We also study the role of bubbles, and 
show that they have positive and negative effect on the social welfare. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
When economists discuss how certain phenomenon affects economy, they often ask
questions such as "How does this phenomenon affect the economic growth?""How does
this phenomenon generate business cycles?""What can government do to reduce the
negative effect?""What effects do this phenomenon have on certain industry?" In my
dissertation, I try to answer these questions with financial frictions.
Chapter 2 is Endogenous Growth, R&D, Credit Constraints and Bubbles. This chap-
ter focus on how credit constraints affect innovation and economic growth, why bubbles
exist in innovation sector and how bubbles related with credit constraints. In this pa-
per, I introduce credit constraints into R&D sector which plays important role in many
endogenous growth model. I find there are multiequilibria in equity value when credit
constraints are binding and bubbles are possible to exist in such economy. To the extent
of my knowledge, this is the first paper which find bubbles exist in standard endogenous
growth model with infinite periods living households. I find that bubbles exist in this
model because it can reduce liquidity mismatch in R&D sector caused by credit con-
straints. Thus, bubbles help R&D sector to get fund. This effect alone with reallocation
effect encourage innovation and economic growth.
I also study Optimal Monetary Policy with Collateral Constraints with Juan Carlos
Cordoba and this is Chapter 3 of my dissertation. In this study, we study how an economy
with collateral constraints and cash in advance constraints can be affected by financial
shocks, technology shocks and money shocks. We also use Ramsey policy to study both
the long term and short term optimal monetary policy. We find that in the long run, the
optimal monetary policy drives the social, but not the individual, shadow price of the
collateral constraint to zero. This translates into a generalized version of the Friedman’s
rule, one that takes into account the degree of credit tightening. In the short run, optimal
monetary policy is counter-cyclical, significantly offsetting the effects of financial shocks
and reducing the welfare loss of the shocks.
Chapter 4, Blockchain Innovation in Global Payments: Network Effects, Creative
Destruction and Bubbles, focuses on how financial frictions can be reduced in a certain
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industry with certain technology. For a long time, global payments are costly and in-
effi ciency. In recent years, people are trying to solve this problem with new blockchain
technology. This paper trying to study how the evolution of this innovation may be and
how it affect the industry. However, both global payments and blockchain technology
face network effects. Although there are many papers about network effects, there are
very few papers about introducing new technologies with network effects. This paper
builds a theoretical model with network effects to study the possible evolution path of
the payments industry, how a particular technology can gain and lose its market share
and whether there exist some technology which can maintain its dominant power.
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CHAPTER 2. ENDOGENOUS GROWTH: INNOVATION, CREDIT
CONSTRAINTS, AND STOCK PRICE BUBBLES
2.1 Introduction
Innovation drives modern economic growth (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman
1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992). At the same time, innovation and technological progress
often correlate with bubbles. For example, in his classic book, Shiller (2015) finds that
there was rapid economic growth and widespread dissemination of technological innova-
tions in the 1920s which led to bubbles burst later in the Great Depression. Similarly,
Sorescu et al. (2018) study 51 major innovations introduced between 1825 and 2000,
from steam engine train to smartphone. They detect bubbles in approximately 73% of
the innovation. A well-known instance where innovation and bubbles coincided was the
so called dot-com boom. In the late 1990s, between 7,000 to 10,000 new Internet compa-
nies were founded seeking to take advantage of the new possibilities open by the internet.
This was a period of rapid innovation and expanded variety of internet products (Wang
2007). At the same time, the Nasdaq Composite stock market index rose 400%.
A second feature of innovation, or research and development (R&D), activities is that
they often face credit constraints (Brown, Martinsson and Petersen 2012). Studies have
found that this is particularly important for small and medium size firms (Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt 2006). Credit constraints are likely due to asymmetric information and
lack of collateral. Information asymetries in turn arise from the underlying characteristics
of innovation since insiders have better information about the real chances of succees.
This paper develops a theory of economic growth driven by innovation, innovators
facing collateral constraints, households acting as venture capitalists, and stock prices
of R&D firms determining the extent of R&D activities. As we show, our model can
deliver rational bubbles that are sustained in equilibrium by a "premium" that arises
when collateral constraints are relaxed. Our model is able to explain why bubbles can
exist as an essential part of a growing economy. We use the model to show the potential
effects of bubbles on innovation and long term growth.
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Our baseline follows endogenous growth models with expanding varieties first devel-
oped by Romer (1990). Romer’s model is widely used to study issues of innovation and
endogenous growth. It has a final goods sector with a representative firm, a monopolistic
competitive intermediate goods sector and a R&D sector. The final goods sector and
intermediate goods sector in this paper are standard. Competitive final goods produc-
ers use intermediate goods, each producer of an intermediate good is a monopolist who
produces a differentiated variety which rights of production are purchased from the R&D
sector.
Our major difference with standard variety models of endogenous growth is in the
R&D sector which is subject to credit constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore’s (2005)
and Miao and Wang (2018). We assume there are a continuum of R&D firms, owned
by households, which use both capital and labor to create new varieties that are sold
to intermediate producers. R&D firms have random investment opportunities which
allow them to transform output into capital which is useful for R&D production. Firms
use their revenue from selling their patents and intratemporal debt from firms without
investment opportunities to fund their investment. R&D firms face credit constraints
which are related to their equity value (feature 2). In the event of default, lenders take
over the firm but some capital is loss in the process. Thus, debts cannot be larger than
the taking over value.
We show that the model exhibit multiple equilibria. In particular, there are two
possible balanced growth paths (BGP), a bubbleless one and a bubbly one. Bubbles
exist in R&D firms’stock price for one of the two BGP (feature 1). In particular, there
may be two components existing in stock prices. One is related to the future revenue of
innovation and investment activities which determines the stock fundamental value. The
other one is not related to future income directly. Even a firm without any capital can
still have high stock price. This part is defined as bubble.
Our baseline model not only reflects two features in innovation in an endogenous
growth model, but also provides a mechanism about how bubbles affect credit constraints
and innovation. The most important result of the model is bubbles stimulate innovation
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when there are credit constraints. There are two effects when there are bubbles. The
direct one is positive while the indirect one is negative. The direct effect is the existence
of bubbles increases the value of collateral directly so firms can borrow more from lenders
when they have investment opportunities thus the R&D industry has more investment
and produce more blueprints. This is similar with crowd in effects which have been
studied in other literature (Hirano and Yanagawa 2017, Miao and Wang 2018).
At the same time, since stock value is also related with capital which we define as
fundamental value of stock, looseness of credit constraints reduce the demand of capital.
Thus capital price decreases and the value of collateral decreases. What is more, the
decrease of capital price also decreases the capital revenue from producing and selling
blueprints so it is a negative effect on investment. These two negative effects offset some
of the crowd in effect. However, the direct effect is the dominant one thus bubbly BGP
has higher growth rate than bubbleless BGP. It is worth to mention that bubbles’size
are related with credit constraints. The tighter credit constraints are binding, the bigger
the bubbles are. The effects of bubbles will also be bigger when credit constraints are
tighter.
Since there are effects in different directions, bubbles can affect the inside value of the
firm differently from the outside value. We find that bubbles typically increase the outside
value of the firm, the value to the lenders in the event of default. Thus, lenders would
like to lend more to the borrowers. But bubbles may increase or decrease the inside value
of the firm, the equity value to the owners. Figure 1 explains the results. In our model,
there is cost for lenders taking over the firm when borrowers default so lenders only get
the firm with ξ of capital. k1 and k2 are borrowers’capital in two cases. V bb and V nb
are bubbly and bubbless value of the firm given capital k. In both cases, the stock price
the lenders can get is higher with bubbles. However, it is undetermined whether bubbles
increase the value (k2 case) or decrease the value (k1 case). This is different with Miao
and Wang (2018). In their paper, bubbles invariably increase the stock price while in our
model it mainly increase the value, to the lenders, in the event of default. The reason
why rational bubbles exist and are sustained in one of the equilibria is due to their role
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Figure 1: The relationship between equity value and capital
relaxing borrowing constraints which provides the underlying liquidity premium. Even
though the revenue from growth of the bubbles is less than interest rate, people still
accept the bubbles because they get additional investment revenue since bubbles increase
collateral.
We also study what happens when bubbles burst. We find that investment is decreas-
ing after the burst of bubbles due to the credit constraints so capital gradually converges
to the bubbleless BGP. However, capital price acts much more rapidly. The mechanism
is just the same as what we have described before.
We then extend our model to study the reallocation effects of bubbles. We show that
besides the effects in the baseline model, stock price bubbles in R&D sectors also attract
more labor into R&D sectors which further help the innovation and economic growth.
Our model suggests bubbles in innovation sector is good for the growth so government
shall not make them burst without careful conditions. The existence of bubbles means
innovation sector may face tight financial constraints. Thus, the right thing government
shall do is to reduce the financial frictions and help innovation firm to get enough funds
when there are bubbles in innovation sector.
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In the remaining part of this section, we review related literature and discuss our
contribution. In section 2, we introduce the baseline model. Section 3 is about analysis
of equilibria. In section 4, we derive BGPs for both bubbly economy and bubbleless
economy and compare the difference. We then give mechanism how bubbles work. In
section 5, we study the dynamics of bubbles. We study the dynamics around the BGP and
what happens when bubbles burst. Extensions are in section 6 where we have stochastic
bubbles and reallocation effects. Section 7 is conclusion.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is mostly related with literature seeking to understand the connection
between growth and bubbles. Tirole (1982) finds that bubbles do not exist in standard
infinite period complete market models because the existence of bubbles lead to the
violation of transeversality conditions. However, economists find that bubbles exist in
some incomplete market models. Overlapping Generations (OLG) models attract a lot
of attention among such models. Samuelson (1958) is an early study using OLG model
with money. In his study, money is pure bubble helping to solve lacking of debt market.
Tirole’s work (1985) is a fundamental study for bubbles in OLG models and has inspired
a large literature. Among them are some papers using OLG models to study growth with
bubbles (e.g., Caballero, Farhi and Hammour 2006, Martin and Ventura, 2012). They
find bubbles can crowd savings away from investment but they also find bubbles may also
provide additional asset and encourage investment. However, These OLG papers have
some disadvantages. The market incompleteness relies on the lack of market between
generations which are not the reasons lead to the existence of bubbles. They are also not
suitable to do realistic quantitative explorations as Hirano and Yanagawa (2017) point
out.
Besides these standard OLG models. Olivier (2000) uses a continuous-time OLG
model. Olivier’s study is the one which is close to our paper. He finds that bubbles in
R&D sector can benefit the growth while bubbles in other type of assets may harm the
economic growth. However, Olivier’s R&D sector is very simple and does not reflect the
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features of innovation. Also, bubbles are not generated by any properties of R&D sector.
Bubbles in R&D sectors and other sectors are generated by demographic reasons and do
not have any difference.
In recent years, there are some papers using infinitely lived agents model to study
bubbles. Hirano and Yanagawa (2017) build a model with financial frictions and het-
erogeneous investments. However, there is no innovation sector so the technology is
exogenous and we cannot know the relationship between bubbles and innovation. Sec-
ondly, they use a useless asset as bubbles. Although this kind of fiat bubbles have long
tradition in literature, it does not reflect what happens in innovation. For example, dot-
com bubbles happen in stock price and has no relationship to any useless asset. This
useless asset also leads to strong crowd out effects as in Olivier (2000). Thirdly, their
model can only be used to study bubbles in countries with intermediate level of financial
frictions. Bubbles do not exist in financially underdeveloped or well-developed countries.
This is clearly not true in innovation because we have already seen some bubbles in the
R&D sector of United States which is one of the most financially developed countries in
the world. Miao and Wang (2014) build a model using stock value as collateral and have
two sectors. One sector has externality while the other one does not. In their model,
bubbles can relax collateral constraints. However, it does not have innovation sector so
the technology of the model is exogenous.
Our paper, however, solve all the problems we discuss before. Our model follows
the work by Miao and Wang (2018). Although it is not an endogenous growth model,
Miao and Wang provide a novel way to think about bubbles. They use an infinitely
lived agents model with credit constraints and heterogeneous investment opportunities
to show that bubbles can exist in standard infinitely lived agents model with incomplete
market and not violate transeversality conditions by reducing liquidity mismatch when
there are investment opportunities. Our paper has the similar setting in R&D sector and
find that bubbles not only affect steady state, but also increases BGP of an endogenous
growth model by stimulating innovation. To the extent of our knowledge, there is no
paper studying bubbles in an endogenous model with a well defined R&D sector before.
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Since bubbles in our paper exist in stock price rather than on an useless asset, our
paper follows Oliver (2000) and bubbles will always help innovations rather than hurt
the economic growth. But our paper shows that even bubbles may not increase stock
price directly, it still stimulate innovations. The mechanism in our paper are related more
with innovation rather than demographics which is a exogenous variable in innovation.
Also, our paper find that although Miao and Wang’s mechanism does exist, bubbles have
more complex effects than Miao and Wang’s mechanism. Besides their positive effects,
there are also some negative effects to offset it. Failing to consider negative effects results
in overestimate the benefit of bubbles. Thus, bubbles increase stock value which can
be acquired by lenders rather than borrowers. In our extension section, we also find
social resource has been reallocated to R&D sector when there are bubbles. This is
a new effect which help the growth of the economy. Our model is rather robust with
financial development. For underdeveloped countries, bubbles are always able to exist.
Even for the most developed countries, bubbles are still able to exist if the investment
opportunities do not come too often. Thus, our model can be used in study bubbles in
different countries.
Besides the papers in growth and bubbles. Our paper is related with papers in different
fields. First of all, this paper is related with papers studying endogenous growth with
innovation. Relationship between economic growth and innovation have been studied
by economists for a long time both in empirical way and theoretical way. Economists
find economic data provides evidence that innovation and growth are positively related
(Griliches and Lichtenberg 1984, Zachariadis 2003). There are also a large number of
papers focus on studying growth and innovation in theoretical way. Romer (1990) builds
a model with a R&D sector where technological innovation is in the form of expanding
varieties created by labor in R&D sectors and existing knowledge. It is the R&D keeps the
economy growth in long term. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) both build model to study how R&D which improve products quality have effects
on growth. Both empirical and theoretical studies find that R&D has strong effects on
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economic growth. Our paper extend studies in this field by introduce credit constraints
and bubbles into R&D sector.
Our paper is also related to papers studying credit constraints. The seminal work of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduces collateral constraints into general equilibrium and
finds collateral constraints have significant effect on the whole economy. Numerous studies
follow Kiyotaki and Moore to study the effect of collateral constraints (e.g., Cordoba and
Ripoll 2004, Iacoviello 2005 and Liu, Wang and Zha 2013). However, most of these studies
focus on business cycles. There are few theoretical papers study innovation with credit
constraints. Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2010) is one trying to study credit constraints
with R&D. They find that patents created from R&D process can be used as collateral
to reduce the negative effect of collateral constraints. Our study provides a noval way to
think of credit constraints and R&D.
2.2 The Baseline Model
Since our model is rather complicated, we use figure 2 to help us introduce our model
before we describe it in detail. Arrows in figure 2 indicate flow of resource and goods.
The representative household hold shares of firms in R&D sectors and provides labor
to R&D firms. The household also get income by receiving dividends and wages. R&D
firms use capital and labor to produce new patents and sell patents to intermediate goods.
After that, a firm in R&D sector has investment opportunity with probability π. Those
who have investment opportunities borrow from those without investment opportunity
and invest but they are constrained by credit constraints. Final goods are transformed
into new capital when firms invest and firms trade capital after investment stage. After
buying patents from R&D firms, intermediate goods producers produce intermediate
goods by using final goods. They sell intermediate goods to final goods producer who
use intermediate goods to produce final goods. Besides the flow of resource, figure 2 also
point out R&D firm j cannot borrow more than firm’s discounted value. When there are
bubbles, firm j’s discounted value is greater than without bubble.
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Figure 2: Bird’s eye view of the baseline model
2.2.1 Households




where β is the discount rate and Ct is the consumption in period t. Household provides
all its labor inelastically every period and aggregate labor supply is normalized to 1.
Household trades stocks of firms in R&D sectors every period and also receive dividends
from stocks it holds. Household uses wages and income from trading stocks to buy















t are R&D firm j’s cum-dividend equity value and











Thus, the representative household maximizes its utility function while budget constraints
and transeversality conditions are satisfied.













where ρt+1 is the stochastic discount factor in asset pricing literature.
2.2.2 Final Goods Producer
In our model, there is only one kind of final goods. Let the final goods are numeraire
and all consumptions, investment and inputs are using final goods. For simplicity we
assume there is only one representative firm produce final goods and it is a price taker.





σ dn, 0 < σ < 1
Here Nt is total number of varieties in period t and Xnt is the amount of intermediate
goods n the final goods producer uses. A denotes the technology of final goods producer.
We use P tn to denote the price of intermediate goods n. Profit maximization problem








subject to the production function. It is easy to solve profit maximization problem and
we have the demand function for intermediate goods n




2.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate good Xnt is produced in competitive monopolistic markets. To produce
an intermediate goods n, an intermediate goods producer has to pay a patent fee ηn to
the R&D firm who creates blueprint n first. After paying the patent fee, the intermediate
goods producer can produce any amount of intermediate goods at any periods. The
technology of intermediate goods producer is it can transform one unit of final product
to one unit of Xnt . Thus his profit is
(P nt − 1)Xnt
Since we have already had intermediate goods n’s demand function, we can find the price




















. Since we know that it is competitive monopolistic markets, the discounted total profits
from selling goods n must be equal to the cost of buying patent to produce goods n,
which means
∑∞















if s 6= t,
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ρ (s, t) = 1 if s = t. Since only variables in ηn are time variables, patents created in the












1−σ = ηn = ηt (2)
2.2.4 R&D Sector
There are a continuum of firms j ∈ [0, 1] in R&D sector. In every period, there are
three stages. We first briefly introduce the three stages and then provide details. At
the first stage, firms hire labor to create new blueprints and sell them to intermediate
producers as patents. During the second stage, some firms have opportunities to invest
and get new capital. They can use their own fund or loans from other firms to invest. At
the third stage, firms trade capital with each other.
At the beginning of period t, firm j in R&D sector has Kjt amount of capital it
accumulated at the end of period t − 1. Thus capital at the first stage is given. It
then hires Ljt amount of labor. Technology for firm j uses both capital and labor to
create new blueprints. T jt is the amount of new blueprints created by firm j in period
t. Current technology level (current amount of blueprints Nt) also has effect on the
innovation process. The production function of R&D firm j is








where Z is an exogenous parameter. This technology of innovation means that technol-
ogy has spillover effects. Every invention benefits future invention by increasing labor
productivity. This property is common setting in endogenous growth models. Capital















It is worth to mention that capital-labor ratio for all firms in R&D sector are same. To
see this, we just solve firms’profit maximization problem and have
Wt
Nt








. By using this result and capital return formula above we find that
rjt = rt
which means every firm has same capital return rate.
After firm j sells its blueprints and get the revenue comes the second stage. Every firm
has a probability of π to have investment opportunity and those firms have investment
opportunities can transform final product into capital. The technology is 1 unit of final
product at period t can be transformed into 1 unit of capital. We assume the market of
capital is open after the investment thus firm j has to use the profits it sells the blueprints
and external source to invest. We assume the only source of external financing for j is
intratemporal loans Ejt from other firms. Those who borrow from other firms have choice
between default or not default. There is no force to ensure borrowers from defaulting so
borrowers are required to provide enough collateral to secure their loans. Following Miao
and Wang (2018), the value of firm is used as collateral. If the owner of borrower chooses
to default and escape with the fund, lenders will take over the firm to compensate their
loss. However, we assume the lender may be not familiar with the borrower’s firm. There
may be a cost during the take over process and the cost is 1 − ξ of total capital. Thus










is firm j’s cum-dividend equity value when there is capital Kjt . The credit
constraints mean that if borrowers default, the discounted value of the firm left to lenders
are no less than the loans so lenders do not have any loss. For borrower j, it is better to
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t ) so there is
no default in this economy.
After investment, all firms come to the third stage at which they can buy and sell




where qt is the price of capital and I
j
t are how many capital firm j plans to create by
investment.
From the setting above, we can write R&D firm j’s cum-dividend equity value at


























Here Djt and K
j
t+1 are dividend and capital for next period when there is no investment
opportunity while DjIt and K
j
It+1 are dividend and next period capital when there is
investment opportunity. The cum-dividend equity value now is equal to the expected
value of dividend plus discounted future cum-dividend equity value when firms make
best choice of debt, investment and future capital.






















t + qt (1− δ)Kjt + qtIjt (7)
(6) are budget constraints when there is no investment opportunity while (7) are budget
constraints where there is investment opportunity. Investment is constrained by available
fund
Ijt ≤ rjtKjt + Ejt (8)
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At the same time, as we have discussed before debt cannot violate credit constraints






. Bellman equation (5) alone with (3), (6), (7), (8) and (9) consist of R&D firm j’s
dynamic programming problem.
2.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
After we describe our model, we can define competitive equilibrium. Let Kt =∫ 1
0
Kjt dj, It =
∫ 1
0
Ijt dj, Tt =
∫ 1
0
T jt dj are aggregate capital, investment, new blueprints.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is defined as allocations{
Yt, Kt, Ct, It, Nt, E
j

























such that household maximize its utility and firms in all
three sectors maximize their profits and market clearing conditions are satisfied which
are stock market is clearing ψjt = 1, labor market is clearing
∫ 1
0










Xnt dn+ It = Yt and the amount of patent follows Nt+1 = Nt + Tt.
2.2.6 Analysis of Equilibria
Similar with other endogenous growth model, many variables in our model increase
to infinity. Balanced growth path (BGP) is the most important result of these models.

























and capital return equation can be written as
rtkt = Zηt (kt)
α − wt (11)
18
We first consider the problem of R&D section. This problem is not a contraction mapping
and may have multiple solutions.









at = rt + qt (1− δ) + π (qt − 1)
(
rt + ρt+1at+1ξ (1− δ)
)
(13)
Bt = [1 + π (qt − 1)] ρt+1Bt+1 (14)
and
qt = ρt+1at+1 (15)
.
Proof. Assume solution of R&D firm j’s problem is (12). Substitute (12), (6) and (7)
into (5) we have
atK
j










t + qt (1− δ)Kjt (16)












and two other constraints (8) and (9) are combined to one constraint
Ijt ≤ rtKjt + ρt+1at+1ξ (1− δ)K
j
t + ρt+1Et+1 (17)
By taking first order derivative of Kjt+1 we have (15).
Since q > 1, firm j invests as many as it can so (17) is binding. By substituting (17)
into (16) and compare the left hand side and right hand side we get (13) and (14).
(15) shows that the price of capital is equal to the value it increases. This is related
with Tobin’s Q theory. Tobin’s Q theory states that if the replacement cost of capital
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is less than the firm’s value then the firm will increase their investment to have more
capital while if the replacement cost of capital is greater than the firm’s value then the
firm will not invest and decrease capital. Since (15) holds, firm j is indifferent between
buying and selling its existing capital. Hence KjIt+1 and K
j
It+1 are indeterminate. We
know qt ≥ 1 because the marginal cost of producing capital is 1. When q > 1, firms with
investment opportunities invest as many as they can so (17) is always binding. If qt = 1,
however, firms are indifferent in making more investment and credit constraints do not
have to bind any more. This is the reason we restrict our main analysis to q > 1.
The two equations (13) and (14) play key roles in our model. It shows that R&D firm
j’s cum-dividend equity value is written as atK
j
t + Bt. The first term atK
j
t means that
capital affects the equity value while the second term Bt does not relate with any goods or
products. In literatures about bubbles, economists define the first term as fundamental
value of a firm while the second term is viewed as bubbles. To see why atK
j
t is the
fundamental value of the firm, we rewrite (13) with (15) and get
qt = ρt+1rt+1 + ρt+1qt+1 (1− δ) + πρt+1 (qt+1 − 1) (rt+1 + qt+1ξ (1− δ)) (18)
If we use ϕt+1 = π (qt+1 − 1) (rt+1 + qt+1ξ (1− δ)) as the expected investment revenue





+ ρt+1 (1− δ) qt+1 (19)




ρ (i, t) (1− δ)i−t−1 (ri + ϕi) +
Υ
ρ(t, 0) (1− δ)t
Here Υ is a constant. ri is the revenue of one unit of capital at period i while ϕi is
expected investment revenue for one unit of capital. By using transeversality conditions,
Υ = 0. Thus qt =
∑∞
i=t+1 ρ (i, t) (1− δ)
i−t−1 (ri + ϕi) is total future income if firm j buy






i=t ρ(i, t) (1− δ)




the total expected revenue from a firm with Kjt capital. It is just fundamental value
of a firm. It is worth to mention that since our paper uses discrete model rather than
continuous time model, at is more complicated than Miao and Wang’s (2018) model. In
their model, at = qt because the return rt+1 and depreciation is omitted in continuous
time model. The second term of equity Bt, however, is not related with any fundamental
future revenue directly and are viewed as bubbles by economists.
Transition of bubbles comes from (14). When there are investment opportunities,
bubbles can be used as collateral to increase investment profit by π (qt − 1)Bt. Just as the
definition given by Miao and Wang (2018), π (qt − 1) is liquidity premium. Later when we
discuss the balanced growth path, one can easily show that bubbles grow like this do not
violate transversality conditions because the growth is smaller than one when discounted
by the discount factor. The reason why people bear the loss to accept such kinds of
asset is it can reduce the liquidity mismatch when firms have investment opportunities
but are restricted by credit constraints. This is consistent with feature 1 of R&D that
rapid technological innovations often correlate with bubbles. When there are investment
opportunities, bubbles help firms face credit constraints. Thus, there are more patents
created and technological innovations are faster. This effect is similar with crowd in effect
in most literature about bubbles. It is deserved to mention that this is just the direct
effect of bubbles. When we compare balanced growth rate between bubbly equilibrium
and bubbleless equilibrium we will find there are also indirect effects of bubbles and they
may offset some of crowd in effect.
Another observation of (14) is bubbles either exist from the beginning or they never
appear. As we have discussed before, the dynamic programming problem is not a contrac-
tion mapping and may have multiple solutions. We have two cases here, an equilibrium
with bubbles and an equilibrium without bubble. The existence of bubbles is just a con-
sensus of the market not relating with any fundamental of a certain firm. If all agree and
believe other will accept the extra values then the bubbles exist. We detrend (14) into
bt = [1 + π (qt − 1)] ρt+1 (1 + gt+1) bt+1 (20)
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Before we move on to study two different equilibria, we first discuss a little further to





T jt dj = Z (Kt)
αN1−αt
Nt+1 = Nt + Z (Kt)
αN1−αt
1 + gNt+1 = 1 + Zk
α
t




(1 + gNt+1)kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + πrtkt + πρt+1
[
at+1 (ξ (1− δ)) kt + (1 + gNt+1)bt+1
]
(23)









ct +Xt + πrtkt + πρt+1
[
at+1 (ξ (1− δ)) kt + (1 + gNt+1)bt+1
]
= AXσt (25)
Thus, equations (1), (2), (10), (11), (13), (15), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25)
alone with transversality conditions consist of a dynamic system which characterize the
detrended equilibria of our model.
2.3 Balanced Growth Path
In this section, we derive and compare balanced growth path (BGP) of two cases. The
first one is the case when there is no bubble while the second one is the case with bubbles.
We have detrended all variables in last sector so variables should be at steady state alone
BGP. We use detrended variables without time subscript to denote the steady state of
these variables. Alone BGP, we know that gN = gC . We will use gN as a substitute when
there is gC for convenience. We first show that in both cases, given q and r, capital k
and growth rate gN are determined in same way.
22











1− β (1 + Zkα)−1





















gN = Z (k)α (27)
Proof. (27) is the direct result of (21) and (22). We only need to get (26) then growth




= β (1 + Zkα)−1





















1− β (1 + Zkα)−1
From (24) we have
















1− β (1 + Zkα)−1
] 1
1−α
Substitute these results into (11) we get (26).
2.3.1 Bubbleless BGP
In bubbleless equilibrium we know bt = 0. From (20) we know that if there is no
bubble in one period, there is no bubble for all periods. Thus equation (20) becomes an
identity. At the same time, (23) becomes
(1 + gNt+1)kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + πrtkt + πρt+1 [at+1 (ξ (1− δ)) kt] (28)
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Proposition 4 When credit constraints are binding, capital price ql capital return rl,
detrended capital kl and growth rate gNl is determined by
1 + gN = (1− δ) + πr + πq (ξ (1− δ)) (29)
q(1 + gN)
β
= r + q (1− δ) + π (q − 1) (r + qξ (1− δ)) (30)
alone with (26) and (27).
Proof. We get (29) by substituting (15) into (28). By (15) and (13) we have (30).
(29), (30) alone with (26) and (27) we derive from proposition 2, we get a four variables
equations system which give us ql, rl, kl and gNl .
Unfortunately, it is impossible to derive the analytical solution of the variables. Thus,
later we cannot compare the results between bubbleless BGP and bubbly BGP directly.
However, we can use numerical method to check the results.
2.3.2 Bubbly BGP
We now study bubbly BGP. Here bt 6= 0 and we cannot omit the (20). Just like what
we have discussed in Bubbleless BGP, next proposition gives us the result of capital price
q capital return r, detrended capital k and growth rate gN . We use qb, rb, kb and gNb as
denotation.
Proposition 5 When there are credit constraints,
qb =
1− β + πβ
πβ
rbb, kbb and gNbb are determined by
q(1 + gN) (1− β + πβ)
πβ2
= r +












alone with (26) and (27).
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Proof. Consider the case alone BGP. (20) gives us qb. By (15) and (13) we have
q(1 + gN)
β
= r + q (1− δ) + π (q − 1) (r + qξ (1− δ))
. Plug qb into it we have (31). (31), (26) and (27) are a three variables three equations
system.
It is easy to check that qb > 1 which means when collateral constraints are binding,
bubbles always exist and the existence of bubbles never totally eliminate the effects of
collateral constraints.
2.3.3 Compare Bubbly BGP with Bubbleless BGP
According to proposition 2, 3 and 4, we know how to get values of variables on
BGP. Unfortunately, it is impossible to get most results analytically for the system is too
complicated. We use numerical method alone with equations we derive before to discuss
how bubbles affect R&D and how credit constraints affect bubbles. The parameters are
reported in table 1.
Table 1: Values of Parameters
parameter β δ π ξ α σ A Z
value 0.95 0.15 0.04 0.5 0.3 0.99 1 0.42
We can get both bubbly BGP and bubbleless BGP. Some important variables alone
the BGP are reported below in table 2. Here e is detrended debt. Compared with BGP
Table 2: Variables’values alone bubbly and bubbleless BGPs
variable b/v(k) gN q a r k e v(k)
bubbly 57.59% 4.0% 2.32 2.53 0.49 0.00038 0.0016 0.0023
bubbleless 0 3.5% 9.26 10.09 0.69 0.00025 0.0010 0.0025
without bubble, bubbly BGP has higher detrended capital level. Thus, the growth rate
of bubbly BGP is greater. At the same time, capital price q, relationship between capital
and equity value a and capital return rate r decrease. The detrended stock value of
bubbly BGP, however, is less than the bubbleless one. To understand these phenomena,
we first review the detrended capital transition (23). From transition function, we know
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that capital increases if revenue increases which means πrtkt increases or firms have more
access to external funding which means ρt+1
[




Bubbles increase discounted stock price if lenders take over the firms thus provide
more collateral to help reduce liquidity mismatch. This direct effect increases investment
in R&D sector so it is the positive effect on growth rate. This positive effect can be called
crowd in effect like other literatures (Hirano and Yanagawa 2017, Miao and Wang 2018)
about bubbles. If we only consider this direct effect, bubbles certainly help R&D and
growth.
However, there is also some indirect effects in general equilibrium which offset some
of the positive effects. First of all, capital in our model not only be used to create new
patents, but also be used to increase cum-dividend equity value so that when they have
investment opportunities they can borrow more. Since bubbles in stock price have the
same effect, demand of capital decreases which decreases price of capital q. That’s why
we see in both examples q and a drop significantly when there are bubbles. This negative
effect offsets some positive effects especially when credit constraints are not binding very
much.
It is worth mention that this direct effect does not ensure higher detrended stock price
of bubbly BGP. This is because indirect effects reduce the stock price by reducing a at
the same time bubbles increase the stock price. Sometimes the indirect effects are not too
big so the stock price still increases while sometimes the indirect effects are big enough
so the stock price may decrease. However, collateral constraints are related with stock
price if lenders take over and this stock price always increases. This is the just we show
in figure 1 in introduction.
That is not the end of the story. The effects we discuss above only ensure alone
bubbly BGP firms get more loans. Since capital price q decreases, return of capital r
also decreases which means that even with same amount of capital firm get less revenue
through innovation activities and has to decrease the investment. Though there are these
two negative effects which offset some of the positive effect, the positive effect is always
the dominant one so stock price bubbles always encourage investment in innovation sector
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and increase growth rate. We can see this result when we do robust check. It is worth to
mention that these direct and indirect effects are very similar with Oliver’s finding.
2.3.4 Robustness
In some literature about bubbles, bubbles may only exist in some economies satisfy
some certain conditions. Hirano and Yanagawa (2017) find that bubbles only exist when
an economy had intermediate financial frictions in their model. Thus, this kinds of
bubble region restrict the usefulness of the model. Although it is impossible to derive
the conditions under which bubbles exist analytically, we can use numerical way to show
that bubbly BGP is rather robust so under most situations bubbles may exist. We also
show that the result bubbly BGPs always have higher growth rate is robust. What is
more, the tighter credit constraints are, the more benefit bubbles bring.
Our study focuses on two parameters ξ and π. ξ reflects the taking over cost when
default. The smaller the ξ is, the more costly the taking over is. Thus, credit constraints
are tighter. During the robust test, we assume other parameters will have values the
same as the study in previous subsection.
Table 3: Robustness of credit constraints
ξ 1 0.7 0.3 0.1
b/V (k) 49.54% 54.69% 60.15% 62.39%
g 4.1% 4.0% 3.9% 3.8%
Table 3 is the result showing how different ξ affect bubbles. b/V (k) characterize the
average size of bubbles compare with firms’value. When ξ decreases, credit constraints
are tighter and tighter. Growth rate decreases and bubbles increase. Even when ξ = 0.1
which means lenders can only take over 10% of original capital when borrowers default,
bubbles still exist. This test means our model is very robust on financial conditions.
Bubbles is possible to exist even in an economy with extremely tight credit constraints.
Besides ξ, π is another parameter we have interested in. π is the probability a firm
find an investment opportunity in one period. If the probability is higher, more firms
have investment opportunities thus the economy is more effi cient in reallocating social
resource. Thus the credit constraints are not binding so tight as before. For this reason,
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bubbles are shrinking quickly with the increasing of π. This can be seen in numerical
analysis.
Table 4: Robustness of opportunities
π 0.003 0.04 0.1 0.2
b/V (k) 70.37% 57.59% 37.94% 11.89%
g 1.9% 4.6% 4.7% 4.9%
What is the relationship when both ξ and π change? We give a region in which
bubbly BGP are possible to exist. As usual, other parameters are the same as before.
As shown in figure 3, the shade area is the region where bubble are possible to exist.
Figure 3: Region in which bubbly BGPs are possible to exist.
With the decreasing of ξ, bubbles may exist in economy with higher chance of investment
opportunities. This is because decreasing of ξ makes credit constraints tighter. Even
there are a large number of firms can invest, they still want to borrow more. From figure
3, we find that bubbles are possible to exist in many different cases which means our
model is more useful than Hirano and Yanagawa (2017). Figure 4 gives us how π and ξ
affect bubbles. Generally speaking, if π decreases of ξ decreases, credit constraints are
tighter, thus value of bubbles are greater.
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Figure 4: Bubbles with different π and ξ
Figure 5 gives us the information on the difference of growth rate between bubbly
BGPs and bubbleless BGPs. Bubbly BGPs always have higher growth rate. At the same
time, the smaller the π and ξ are, the bigger the difference it is. The reason is very
simple, smaller π and ξ increase the tightness of credit constraints so bubbles play more
important role in the economy.
2.4 Dynamics
In this section, we study the dynamics of the model. We first study the transition
around bubbly BGP. We then study what happens when bubbles burst unanticipatedly.
The stochastic burst of bubbles will be studied in next section where we extend our
baseline model into a stochastic model.
2.4.1 The Dynamics around Bubbly BGP
Since we have a big dynamic system, we are unable to derive analytical results for local
dynamics. However, we can solve it numerically. We find rank conditions are satisfied
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Figure 5: Difference of growth rate between bubbly and bubbleless BGPs
for our examples. As in figure 6, we start from the point where detrended capital is
about 10% more than alone BGP path. At this point, detrended bubbles is about 2.8%
smaller than the BGP bubbles. With time going on, detrended capital is decreasing while
detrended bubbles are increasing. In the end, they converge to the level of those alone
BGP with bubbles.
2.4.2 Unanticipated Burst of Bubbles
One of the most obvious feature of bubbles are bubbles tend to burst. For example,
when Dot-com bubbles burst suddenly, Nasdaq Composite index fell 25% in one week.
The price of Bitcoin dropped from around $19000 to around $6000 in less than two
months. (He 2018) Very few people realize the bubbles is going to burst before it really
happens. There are two ways to deal with burst of bubbles. The first approach is bubbles
will burst unanticipatedly. However, many economists believe that although people do
not know when bubbles burst, they expect bubbles will burst sooner or later. Thus the
second approach is stochastic bubble. We study how unanticipated burst of bubbles have
30
Figure 6: Dynamics when there are 10% more capital than alone bubbly BGP
effects on the economy in our model. In next section, we study what happens when
bubbles burst stochastically.
We assume the economy is growing alone bubbly BGP when there is an unanticipated
shock at period 2. The shock changes the consensus that people believe others will not
accept the overvaluation of equity. Thus, bubbles burst and there is no bubble from that
periods on. Figure 7 is the result of what happens when bubbles burst.
From figure 7 we can see what happens with other variables when bubbles burst.
Since there is no bubble any more, credit constraints bind tighter and firms cannot get
so much loans as before. Firms have to reduce their investment which leads to the
decreasing of detrended capital from period 3. Capital gradually converges to the level
of bubbleless BGP. Growth is also slower because innovation is slowed with the limit of
capital. Capital price, however, jump at the time of bubbles burst and then grows slowly.
The jump of price is due to the jump of capital demand since capital is now the only
instruments to be used to increase the value of collateral. After that, amount of capital is
decreasing which leads to the scarcity of capital which drives the price up gradually and
also increases capital return rate. Return of capital r increases. When bubbles burst,
the jump of capital price increases capital return rate immediately. After that, capital
return rate goes up gradually with the increasing of capital and capital price. a increases
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Figure 7: Unanticipated burst of bubbles
following the same pattern of capital price. Thus, economy will converge to bubbleless
BGP gradually if bubbles burst unanticipatedly.
2.5 Extensions
In this section, we study two extensions of our model. In the first extension, we
introduce stochastic bubbles into our model. Up to now, bubbles are deterministic and
they only burst when there is an unanticipated shock. People do not believe bubbles may
burst unless it really happens even though they admit there are bubbles in stock market.
These assumptions are not very realistic. Though it is hard to know when bubbles burst,
people believe bubbles will burst in the future and the probability of burst affects people’s
decision. To reflect this, we assume bubbles may burst every periods with a probability.
The second extension is studying how bubbles affect resource allocation. In the base-
line model, we focus on how bubbles affect R&D sector directly. However, bubbles in one
sector may have reallocation effects of resource. In the second extension, we assume both
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final product sector and R&D sector must use labor to produce and labor flow from one
sector to the other sector freely. Thus, bubbles in R&D sectors can reallocate labor.
2.5.1 Stochastic Bubbles
We assume if there are bubbles, they may burst at probability θ every period. The
burst will happen before R&D activities. Other setting are the same as baseline model.
If bubbles burst, everything works like the bubbleless equilibrium in the baseline model.
We only need to consider the case when there are bubbles. Everything is the same as


































is the bubbleless cum-dividend equity value we have derived before. We
show the next proposition in Appendix







at = (1− θ) rt + (1− θ) qt (1− δ) + (1− θ) π (qt − 1)
[
rt + ρt+1at+1ξ (1− δ)
]
+ θa#t (33)
Bt = (1− θ) [1 + π (qt − 1)] ρt+1Bt+1 (34)
We can see the stochastic bubbles model has the similar result with baseline model.
The only difference between (33), (34) and (13), (14) are the probability of burst. There
is 1− θ chance that bubbles still exist at the beginning of that period thus we have terms
similar like before. However, there is probability θ that bubbles burst. If bubbles do
burst, firms will operate as the firms in bubbleless equilibrium so we have the term θa#t .
We then use numerical method to study the stochastic model.
Here we have θ = 0.05 and all other parameters are same as the baseline model. The
results are in figure 8. After the burst of bubbles, the path to the bubbleless equilibrium
is similar with the unanticipated shock. The mechanism is the same as baseline model.
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Figure 8: Burst of stochastic bubbles
2.5.2 Reallocation Effects Model
We assume the household has labor supply
_
L. Budget constraint of the representative










L Final goods producer now has





1−σdn, 0 < σ < 1. Here LYt is the labor hired
by final goods producer. Thus, only
_
L − LYt labor works in R&D sector. Since most
derivation and results are similar with baseline model. We put all the derivation into
appendix. We only provides the numerical results here.
Given the parameters in baseline model and
_
L = 2, we have bubbly BGP and bub-
bleless BGP in table 5. The results are similar like we have discussed in baseline model.
Table 5: Variables alone BGPs in reallocation effects model
b/V (k) gN q a r k LY
bubbly 53.97 1.7% 2.32 2.48 0.44 0.00010 1.46
bubbleless 0 1.4% 8.22 8.77 0.60 0.00006 1.50
The only difference is that labor works in final products sector in bubbly economy is less
than the labor in bubbleless economy. Which means labor flow from final products sector
to R&D sector. The intuition is simple. We have discussed that there are more capital
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in R&D sector when there are bubbles thus the marginal productivity of labor in R&D
sector is higher. R&D firms would like to hire more labor to produce new blueprints. This
effect alone with the effects we discussed before increases the positive effects of bubbles
in R&D sector and helps the economic growth.
We also study the burst of bubbles. As the baseline model, the pattern of burst
both in unanticipated shock and stochastic bubbles show the similar result. We will only
report the unanticipated shock here in figure 9. The stochastic bubbles are reported in
appendix.
Figure 9: Unanticipated burst of bubbles in reallocation effects model
Most of the path are similar with baseline model. The only significant difference is
when bubbles burst, growth rate first increases and then decreases gradually in this model
while growth rate decreases with the decreasing capital in baseline model. This may be
a surprising result. Why does the economy grow faster when the bubbles burst and
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capital start decreasing? This is because the change of stochastic discount rate ρt. Since
ρt increases generally after the burst of bubbles, the price of patent ηt also increases.
Although capital decreases soon after the burst of bubbles, increasing of patent price
increases the marginal productivity of labor in R&D sector thus it attracts more labor
flows out of final goods sector and works for R&D sectors. This effect compensate the
decreasing of capital. At the beginning, this reallocation effect is strong enough so there
are more patents are produced. With less and less capital, marginal productivity of labor
is decreasing and people flow out of R&D sector and the growth rate is smaller and
smaller until it reaches the bubbleless BGP.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce credit constraints into a standard endogenous growth
model with innovation. We show that there are multiple equilibria and stock price bubbles
exist in one of the equilibria. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the only study about
endogenous growth with bubbles by using a well defined R&D growth model and it is the
only model in which bubbles are generated by features of innovation sectors. Our study
finds that stock price bubbles in innovation sector encourage innovation and increase
growth rate by reducing liquidity mismatch. Economy with tighter credit constraints
benefit more from bubbles. Thus, it may be wise for governments not to make bubbles
in innovation sector burst but use policy instruments to reduce financial frictions in
innovation sector. This paper can be a bridge between traditional growth model and
bubbles.
Besides the economic phenomenon we discussed in this paper. There are some ex-
tension which can be done in the future. Our paper has R&D sector and bubbles. At
the same time, household buy shares of R&D firms. These are close to the situation the
venture capitalists face. In the future, we can extend the R&D sector and this model
may be used to study venture capitalists’behavior.
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CHAPTER 3. COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, FINANCIAL CRISIS
AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY1
3.1 Introduction
We study optimal monetary policy in the presence of collateral constraints. For this
purpose, we introduce cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints into a version of the Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) economy, one devised by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004b). The model
exhibits simple tractable heterogeneity by considering two separate groups of individuals
who differ in their rates of time preference. In equilibrium, the more patient group
become lenders while the impatient group become borrowers. We take model seriously and
exploit its tractability to derive some sharp results regarding optimal monetary policies
and optimal monetary responses to financial and non-financial shocks. The government
controls the money supply via helicopter drops. The simplicity of the structure allows
us to clearly describe the mechanisms at work. The main contribution of the paper is
to characterize optimal monetary policy, in the Ramsey sense, both in the short run and
the long run. Our paper is also close to Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a), who also introduce
cash via CIA constraints but in a more stylized version and without studying optimal
policies.
We find that the optimal monetary policy eliminates the social cost of the collateral
constraints in the long run. The results is novel. Absent credit constraints, money is
superneutral and optimal monetary is undetermined in the steady state. In contrast,
money is neutral but not superneutral when collateral constraints are binding. In par-
ticular, the price of collateral is a negative function of the inflation rate due to the fact
that cash is needed for capital purchases, the collateral in the economy. By lowering the
inflation rate, the planner increases the price of capital and relaxes credit limits. The
optimal monetary policy is a generalized version of the Friedman rule, one that takes into
account the degree of credit tightness. The optimal inflation rate is a positive function
of the degree of credit tightness, the cash-component of investment, and of borrowers’
1This is a joint work with Juan Carlos Cordoba
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discount rate. The Friedman rule, one that drives the nominal interest rate to zero, is
obtained as an special case when the full value of the capital can be collateralized, and
borrowers share the same discount rate of lenders. We also find that monetary policy does
not work very well in reducing welfare losses of business cycles caused by TFP shocks
but it is very effective in reducing welfare losses caused by financial shocks.
A large body of research utilizes Kiyotaki and Moore’s mechanism, and part of this
literature includes a monetary component. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a) study the role of
collateral constraints in transforming small monetary shocks into large persistent output
fluctuations by using CIA to introduce money. Iacoviello (2005) studies a monetary
new Keynesian model by using house as collateral. Monacelli (2009) uses a two sector
New Keynesian model with durable goods and nondurable goods. Araujo, Schommer and
Woodford (2015) consider an unconventional policy which central bank can purchase risky
asset. Cao (2017) study the Ramsey optimal fiscal and monetary policy to fiscal shocks.
Her paper uses some similar technique as our paper. However, her paper does not provide
a long run rule for monetary policy and does not answer if monetary policy itself can be
used to deal with business cycles. Liu, Wang and Zha (2013) study changing price of
collateral land’s effect on macroeconomic fluctuations and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
find financial shocks such as change of collateral contributes more to macroeconomic
fluctuations. However, they do not introduce money into their models nor discuss the
long term effect of financial frictions in detail.
A number of papers study monetary policy in the presence of credit frictions. Fiore
and Tris (2012) and Curdia and Woodford (2017) are recent examples. They both use
new Keynesian models with credit spreads to introduce a form of market imperfections.
However, as with most other traditional new Keynesian models, monetary policy only
works through the interest rate. They ignore other channels of monetary policy and
money itself is dispensable. The optimal monetary policy at steady state makes the
inflation rate zero because the only long term role of monetary policy is to eliminate the
ineffi ciency associated to price stickiness. Also, many people are facing with a situation
that even they would like to borrow at given interest rate they cannot get what they
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want to borrow when financial crisis happens. Although credit spread is a good way to
introduce financial incompleteness, it cannot reflect this scenario.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the distributive effects of monetary pol-
icy, in particular optimal policies, which has attract economists’attention in recent years.
A classical paper in this topic is Doepke and Schneider (2006). Doepke and Schneider
empirical study to find the redistribution channel of monetary policy. Auclert (2017)
builds a model to reflect three channels redistribution effect. Our model, though simple,
provides a new channel of redistribution. We find that when there is a financial fric-
tion such as collateral constraints and cash plays some role in an economy, an inflation
changes the cost of buying capital and in the end lead to the reallocation of capital. It
shows that redistribution effect of monetary policy itself can have significant affect on the
economy when there is incompleteness in financial market even without any assumptions
in new Keynesian setting like most other monetary policy literature has done. It is be-
cause incompleteness of financial market makes social resource cannot be used optimally.
Monetary policy can redistribute social resources and reduce the welfare loss. For this
reason, there must be a optimal monetary policy in the long run which depends on the
incompleteness of financial market. In short run, it can reduce the welfare loss generated
by financial shock but cannot help TFP shock because the latter has lump-sum effect
rather than changes the distribution of resources.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the model and derives the
conditions of competitive equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium
both in the long run and short run. The role of monetary policy and the effects of shocks




There are three types of goods in the economy: consumption, c, capital, k, and money,
m. There are two types of individuals, type 1 and type 2, with population sizes of measure
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iu(cit), i ∈ {1, 2}, (1)
where βi is a discount factor, cit is consumption of agent i in period t, and u is a standard
utility function. The following is the key assumption of the model.
Assumption 1. 1 > β1 > β2 > 0.
According to this Assumption 1, type 1 agents are more patient than type 2 agents.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a and 2004b), this as-
sumption provides a convenient way to introduce tractable heterogeneity, with type 1
agents eventually becoming the sole lenders while type 2 agents eventually becoming the
sole borrowers. More importantly, the different discount factors make the collateral con-
straint bind and generates an ineffi cient allocation of resources, as explained below. The
assumption adds importance for our goal, of characterizing optimal policies, because it
also creates a difference between the social and private rate of discounts. Such difference
is at the core of the optimal monetary policy derived in Section 4. We also assume that
there is no uncertainty in the model except for the unanticipated shock.
Individuals utilize their capital and one unit of labor to produce yt units of output at
time t. In particular yt = eAtf(kt−1) where eAt is the productivity of period t and f(.)
is a standard strictly concave function. An agent’s total resources in period t includes
production, yt, real loans, bt, real money holdings, mt−1, and government transfers, tt.
Resource are used to consume, buy capital, accumulate money, and repay loans. The
budget constraint of type i agent is







where pt is output price, Rt is the nominal interest rate, qt is real price of capital, and
πt is the inflation rate defined as πt :=
pt
pt−1
− 1. The real interest rate, rt, is defined as
1 + rt = Rt/ (1 + πt) .
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Agents face Cash-in-Advance (CIA) constraints for consumption and investment as
described by







Specifically, a proportion of η investment and a proportion of ζ consumption needs to be
paid in cash.
To prevent default, borrowers are required to provide enough collateral to secure their
loans. Capital serves as collateral but only up to a fraction γt is recovered upon default.
The amount of borrowing is thus limited to bi,t ≤ γtqnt+1ki,t/Rt+1 in nominal terms, or
(1 + rt+1)bi,t ≤ γtqt+1ki,t (4)
in real terms. The exogenous variable γt captures the degree of financial development,
and we will use this variable to study exogenous financial shocks.
3.2.2 Government
The government is just a central bank fully in control of the money supply, M st . The
government prints money in the amountM st −M st−1 at period t, which is then distributed
equally among the population. Specifically,
tt =
M st −M st−1
1 + n
.
In this section money supply is exogenous. Next section studies optimal monetary
policy.
3.2.3 Resource Constraints
There are four economywide resource constraints in the economy: money, capital,
assets and consumption goods. We assume that the aggregate amount of capital is fixed
at the amount K, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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K ≥ nk1,t + k2,t (5)
nb1,t + b2,t ≥ 0 (6)
ny1,t + y2,t ≥ nc1,t + c2,t
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
This section defines and characterizes the competitive equilibrium. A first subsection
describes optimal conditions and derives some implications. A second subsection focuses
on steady state properties of the competitive equilibrium. We show that, under minimal
restrictions, a unique steady state solution exists and characterize the "long run" effects
of monetary policy and financial development, as described by γ. A third subsection
uses numerical simulations around the steady state to characterize the impulse response
functions of three types of shocks: productivity, At, financial, γt, and monetary. The
simulations will help us understand the role of optimal monetary policy derived in a later
section.
Definition 1 A Competitive Equilibrium are sequence of prices, {pt, Rt, qt}∞t=0, and allo-
cations, {ci,t,mi,t, ki,t, bi,t, tt}∞t=0, such that: (i) households utility (1) is maximized subject
to (2), (3), (4) given prices; markets for money, capital and loans all clear given exoge-
nous sequences {At, γt,M st }∞t=0.
Goods market clearing is not explicitly considered in this definition as it automatically
clears due to Walras’law.
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3.3.1 Solving the Model
A full solution of the model is provided in the appendix. We now focus only on some
of the key conditions. We guess and later verify that, around the steady state, patient
agents are lenders while impatient agents are borrowers. Optimal saving and capital








1(c1t+1) (1 + rt+1)





η (Rt − 1) + 1




(Rt+1 − 1) ηqt+1 + eAt+1f
′
(k1,t) + qt+1
ζ (Rt+1 − 1) + 1
(8)
Equation (7) is lenders’Euler equation. The only difference with a traditional one is
the use of an adjusted marginal utility, u
′
1(c1t)
ζ(Rt−1)+1 , rather than just the marginal utility.
The adjustment takes into account that a fraction ζ of consumption requires cash to be
accumulated in advance and its opportunity costs is the interest rate. A standard Euler
equation is recovered when ζ = 0.
Equation (8) characterizes lenders’optimal capital choice. The left hand side is the
marginal cost of buying one additional unit of capital at time t in terms of consumption
good. The term η(Rt−1)+1
ζ(Rt−1)+1 is the relative cost imposed by the CIA constraint. When
ζ = η the relative cost is just one. If η > ζ and R > 1 then capital investments are
relatively more costly than consumption goods. The right hand side is the marginal
benefit of buying one additional unit of capital. It includes the marginal product of
capital, the resale value of the capital and saving from having extra cash in the amount
(Rt+1 − 1) ηqt+1 without having to accumulate it in advance.
Consider next the borrowers’ problem. Let Ω2,t be the Lagrangian multiplier for






















(k2,t) + (1− η − γt)qt+1
1 + πt+2
.
We define µt as the increase rate of money supply. Then








Government can choose either {tt} or {µt} as the instrument of monetary policy. We





For purposes of comparison, it is convenient to characterize the equilibrium allocation
in absence of collateral constraints. The following proposition states that the allocation
of capital is effi cient.






) for t > 0 when there is no collateral con-
straints.
Proof. See appendix.
Without collateral constraints, the difference in discount factors leads only to differ-
ences in the allocation of consumption but not of capital. In particular, consumption of
impatient individuals eventually drift towards zero while patient individuals consumes all
the output. This requires borrowers to accumulate enough debt. As we show next, when
collateral constraints are binding the allocation of capital is not effi cient and consumption
for borrowers and lenders is interior.
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3.3.2 Steady State
We no characterize the steady state of the economy. Notation without subscript refers
to steady state values. In the presence of collateral constraints, the following suffi cient
condition guarantees a unique steady state.
Assumption 2
(1− β2 + π) η + β2 (1− β1γ) > 0.
This assumption requires is relatively weak as it is satisfied by any positive inflation.
It will also be satisfied by the optimal inflation, as shown in the next section.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, there exists a unique steady state. The










β21 [η(1 + π)(1− β2) + β2(1− η)(1− β2)− β2(β1 − β2)γ]












f(k2)− (1− β1)γqk2 +
π
1 + n





nf(k1) + f(k2)− c2
n
(15)





π = µ. (17)
By using (8) and (16), we have (13). (10) gives


























ζ[nf(k1) + f(k2)] (19)
The budget constraint (2), CIA constraint (3) and collateral constraint (4) of agent 2
together generate
(1 + ζπ)c2 + (1− β1)γqk2 = f(k2) +
t
p
(1 + π) (20)
We have
K = nk1 + k2 (21)
by (5).
nc1 + c2 = nf(k1) + f(k2) (22)




























nb1 + b2 = 0 (26)
The equations above along with (13) characterize the steady state. From (13), (16), (17),
(18), it follows that:
β21[−η(1 + π)(1− β2)− β2(1− η)(1− β2) + β2(β1 − β2)γ]
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−(1− η)β22 − 2β2η(1 + π) + β22η(1 + π) + β22β1γ
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> 0. Assumption guarantees that the term −(1− η)β22 −
2β2η(1 + π) + β
2
2η(1 + π) + β
2





/∂β2 < 0. Existence and




spans the real line
and it is strictly decreasing in k2.
From (19) and (20), we have









f(k2)− (1− β1)γqk2 +
π
1 + n
ζ (nf(k1) + f(k2))
]
which is (14). After that, we can easily get (15) by using (22)
Proposition 3 shows that there is always a productivity gap between borrowers and
lenders when collateral constraints are binding. In particular, borrowers have higher





(k2) and borrowers have capital k∗2. When collateral constraints are binding,





The effects of monetary policy on steady state allocations is fundamentally affected by
the presence of the collateral constraints. In absence of collateral constraints, money will
be superneutral in long term: inflation will have no effect on the distribution of capital
or consumption, even if cash is needed for both consumption and investment. As we









). In the appendix we also discuss that in equilibrium
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Figure 1: Productivity gap
borrowers’consumption drifts toward zero while lenders’consume all production. Thus,
monetary policy does not affect the asymptotic equilibrium.
Consider now the equilibrium with binding collateral constraints. According to equa-
tion (12) in Proposition 2, k2 is a negative function of the inflation as long as cash is
needed for capital investments (η > 0). The intuition is as follows: the inflation tax
makes capital accumulation more costly for both borrowers and lenders, but in the mar-
gin, it affects more borrowers than lenders. The reason is that, as shown in equation
(13), the price of capital falls when the inflation is higher tightening credit constraints.
The price of capital described by (13) is the present discounted value of the marginal
product of capital. A higher inflation, lowers the price of capital due to the added cost
of holding cash for its purchase. When η = 0, inflation does not affect the distribution of
capital but it still affects the distribution of consumption, as long as cash is required for
its purchase.
The degree of financial development of the economy is captured by γ. A larger γ
describes a more developed financial system. As described by equation (12), a higher
γ reduces the steady state productivity gap and improves effi ciency of the economy. In
addition to the direct effect of relaxing borrowing constraints, for a given value of the
collateral, the improved allocation of capital also raises the price of capital, as shown by
equation (13), inducing an even further relaxation of the credit limits. The direct and
indirect effects could be quantitatively significant. Figure 2 show the results above.
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Figure 2: Change of financial conditions and monetary policy
3.3.3 Impulse Response Functions
We now study short term dynamics of the model around the steady state. We study
impulse response functions to three types of unexpected shocks: a TFP shock (A-shock),
a financial shock (γ−shock) and a monetary shock (µ−shock). For this purpose, we
perform numerical simulations2.
Assume At and γt follow the processes:
At = ρAt−1 + εt, and
γt = δγt−1 + (1− δ)γ + εt,
where γ is the steady state of γt, εt˜N (0, σ
2
ε) , εt˜N (0, σ
2
ε) and Cov(εt, εt) = 0. Assume
the utility function is ln(.) and the production function is standard neoclassical production
function eAtfi(ki,t−1) = eAtk0.7i,t−1. We use the following parameters for our simulations
β1 = 0.99, β2 = 0.98, η = 0.6, ζ = 0.95, γ = 0.995, n = 1, K = 1, ρ = 0.65, δ = 0.65.
Although the exact parameter values are important, and affect, the quantitative effects,
the qualitative effects are overall robust to the exact parameters.
Consider first a TFP shock. Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of a TFP drop of 1%
at time 0. From the figure, it is clear that the TFP shock in our model does not provides
any surprise. One percent TFP shock causes a one percent decrease of production and
2We use Dynare 4.5.1 to simulate our model.
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consumption. Other real terms effect are quite small and can be ignored. There is no
much amplification nor extra persistence beyond what is generated exogenously by the
shock. These results are consistent with the findings of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004b).
Figure 3: TFP shock
Consider next a financial shock. In particular, consider a shock at time zero that
decrease γ0 by 0.01, from the benchmark of 0.995 to 0.985. Figure 4 shows the corre-
sponding impulse responses functions. We find that even a small shock to the financial
sector, which quiet down in about 10 periods, can generate very persistent fluctuations.
The recession of total output is not particularly large but much more persistent than the
financial shock. There are also significant redistribution effects. Although consuming a
little more in the very beginning, lenders in this economy soon bear a relative big loss.
On the other hand, borrowers in this economy benefit from the financial shock, after an
initial drop in consumption.
This result is a little counterintuitive. How can borrower benefit when they face
tighter collateral constraints? When there is a financial shock and γ decreases, borrowers
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cannot borrow as much as before with the same amount of capital. Then they have
to reduce consumption for a bit because they cannot borrow as much as they used to.
Interest rates also fall reflecting the drop in the demand for debt. Borrowers sell land
seeking to smooth consumption. Land price begins to fall and so is production because
borrowers have higher marginal productivity. Lenders’wealth decreases for both the land
price and interest revenue decreases so they have to reduce their consumption.
Figure 4: Financial shock
We then study the role of monetary policy. We increase the money increase rate 1+µ
by 0.01.
From Figure 5, the money shock also generates fluctuations. An expansionary mone-
tary policy lead to higher inflation and higher nominal interest rate. Lenders will reduce
consumption while borrower increase consumption. Borrowers also reduce capital and
debts and the asset price decrease. Since borrowers have more productivity, total output
decreases.
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Figure 5: Monetary shock
Why does expansionary monetary policy generates this result? There are two channels
monetary policy work through. The first one is it changes the cost of keeping cash. Just
as we have discussed in section about steady state. Because there are cash in advance
constraints, households have to keep some cash for future consumption and buying capital.
Inflation reduces the purchasing power which means there is a cost of keeping cash. The
higher inflation the higher cost keeping cash would be. Thus both lenders and borrowers
tend to reduce the demand of capital when inflation rate increases. However, capital can
only be used in producing by lenders while borrowers can also use capital to secure their
debts. Since the demand of capital reduce the price of capital and borrowers cannot use
the same amount of capital to borrow the same amount of debts. This lead to borrowers’
demand of capital decreases more than the lenders’so borrowers sell capital to lenders
which again decreases the debts secured and that’s why we see there is a decrease in
debt. Since borrowers have higher productivity than lenders, the reallocation of capital
generates recession. And since borrowers do not need cash for capital any longer and can
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even get some cash by selling capital they will increase their consumption. At the same
time, buying capital reduce lenders’cash for consumption. What is worse, the decreasing
price of capital and decreasing debt revenue also make lenders reduce consumption.
The second channel is redistribution of money. At steady state, lenders has much more
cash than borrowers. In our simulation, lenders have about 5.7 times cash as borrowers
have. When there is an unanticipated expansionary monetary shock by helicopter drop,
both the lenders and borrowers have more cash than they plan to have in nominal term.
However, the proportion of cash between borrowers and lenders increases because when
there is an one percent increase of money supply the borrowers’cash increases more than
one percent while lenders’increases less than one percent. Since an one percent shock
generates one percent inflation lenders have less cash in real term and borrowers have
more cash in real term. Thus an expansionary monetary policy dilute lenders’ cash.
Although this channel does exist, we find this redistribution effect is quite small. Things
do not change much even we revise the helicopter drop monetary policy to a situation
that helicopter drop base on the current holding of cash which means those who have
10% of money get 10% new money. (please see appendix) For this reason we mainly use
first channel to discuss optimal monetary policy in next section.
3.4 Optimal Monetary Policy
We have found that the money is not superneutral in the long term and can have
big effect on the economy in the short term. Thus it is natural to come to the question.
What is the optimal monetary policy for the government? To answer this question, we
use Ramsey policy to study optimal monetary policy. The setting of Ramsey policy is
described as below.
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In this section, we assume there is a benevolent government. The government does not
consume. The only aim of the government is to maximize social welfare by using monetary
policy and it cannot affect the economy except by using monetary policy. Thus, what
the government faces is a Ramsey problem.










where 0 < α < 1 is the weight of two types of agents’utility functions
Definition 4 A Ramsey problem is to choose the competitive equilibrium defined in De-
finition 1 to maximize (27) by choosing optimal monetary policy 1 + µt.
We can solve this Ramsey problem by using Lagrangian method, please see the ap-
pendix. Then we will use the result to study what’s the optimal monetary policy in the
long run by studying the steady state and in the short run by using simulations.
3.4.1 Steady State
Proposition 5 Optimal monetary policy makes the Lagrangian multiplier for borrowers’
collateral constraint ν = 0 at steady state and the optimal money increase rate and
inflation rate are
1 + µ = 1 + π =








if η > 1− γ.
Proof. See Appendix. We can also easily check that optimal monetary policy satisfy
Assumption 2.
Our steady state optimal monetary policy is a long term optimal monetary policy.
The most famous long term optimal monetary before is Friedman rule. Friedman (1969)
maintains optimal monetary policy should make R = 0 because the social cost of keeping
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cash is zero while the individual cost of keeping cash is R. The best optimal monetary
policy should make the social cost and individual cost of keeping cash the same. Although
other authors criticize Friedman rule such as Phelps (1973). They tend to discuss the
optimal inflation rate with government spending. In our paper, however, even there is no
government expenditure, we still show that Friedman rule is not the optimal monetary
policy because the revenue of money is not zero for it can be used to reallocate capital.
If cash is not needed to buy capital, monetary policy would loss its benefit and then
Friedman rule holds. At the same time, notice that when γ = 1 and β2 → β1, our
optimal monetary policy also converge to Friedman rule because collateral constraints
almost not bind in that situation so it comes to a situation close to Friedman rule. This
two situation indicates Friedman rule works only in a special situation.
The Largragian multiplier ν = 0 means that at the steady state the optimal monetary
policy should make the shadow price of collateral be zero which means it cannot benefit
the whole society any more if borrowers can borrow more. At this point, reducing more
financial incompleteness is not the best choice for the society. However, this does not
mean collateral constraints do not bind any more. By plugging optimal monetary policy
into Largragian multiplier in appendix we find shadow price of collateral constraints for













ηβ21 − β22(γ + η − 1)
(γ + η − 1)β21
> Ω2
β22(1− γ)
(γ + η − 1)β21
≥ 0
so shadow price for borrowers are still greater than zero. Borrowers are still facing
binding collateral constraints though it is not so tight as before. We have showed that
when γ = 1 and β2 → β1, optimal monetary policy becomes Friedman rule. At that





) = 0. It is because in that situation, borrowers and lenders
converges to representative model. There are not borrowers and lenders any more so
collateral constraints do not have effect.
We compare this model with model without collateral constraints. We have already
discussed a model without collateral constraints when we discuss steady state in competi-
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tive equilibrium. We conclude that money is superneutral at the asymptotic steady state.
Thus there is no optimal monetary policy in long term without collateral constraints.





(k2,t)? If an government tries to do so, it leads to too strong reallocation
of wealth. Although the total production does increase, the change of wealth leads to
a decrease of social welfare. Inflation smaller than optimal monetary policy leads to a
welfare loss.
For an economy with greater γ or an economy has more developed financial system,
the government should choose more expansionary monetary policy to stimulate borrowers
to accumulating capital. For an economy with smaller γ or an economy has less developed
financial system, the government should choose more contractionary monetary policy.
From (28) and the steady state results (13), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21) we have















When γ increase both k2 and q decrease. That’s to say when using optimal monetary
policy, an economy has greater γ has cheaper capital price and borrowers have less capital.
The marginal productivity gap is greater with greater γ. These results are on the contrary
to the original results with different γ in competitive equilibrium. Why is that?
For an economy with smaller γ, borrowers have to use more capital to secure their
debts and the capital price is low as we have shown in section 3. Benefit of keeping capital
for borrowers are less so the borrowers would not like to have much capital. It makes the
collateral constraints bind more and the economy is ineffi cient. The government choose
to use more contractionary monetary policy because this can offset the ineffi cient by
increasing the capital price and capital borrowers kept as we have seen in section 3. Since
γ is less, only with capital valued more it can make the economy runs effi cient enough.
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For the reason above, it seems that the government would like to choose an overshoot
monetary policy.
3.4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy in Fluctuations
Now we turn to study how monetary policy can be used to deal with economic fluctu-
ations. We have known from Section 3.2 that both technology shock and financial shock
can generate fluctuations. In this section, we use the same parameters to do simulations
to see how monetary policy can be used to eliminate fluctuations. Before report our
result, we give a brief review about results of financial shock and monetary policy in
competitive equilibrium. When there is a financial shock (i.e. γt decreases), it generates
a long lasting fluctuations. There is both recession of output and redistribution effect
between lenders and borrowers. Monetary policy mainly works through changing cost
of keeping cash which can affect the demand of capital and price of capital. These to-
gether changes the benefit of keeping capital especially for borrowers which leads to a
reallocation of total capital.
We find that monetary policy cannot be used to eliminated TFP shock. The reason
is monetary policy in our model works through reallocation of capital while TFP shocks
only have lump-sum effect. For the financial shock part, however, the monetary policy is
very effective. A short periods contractionary monetary policy can totally eliminate the
fluctuations of most real terms. Figure 6 is the impulse responses against γ shock with
and without optimal monetary policy. Blue lines are impulse responses when there is a
financial shock while the government does not response to the shock and still uses the
optimal monetary policy at steady state. Red lines are the results when the government
uses optimal monetary policy. We can see the optimal monetary policy is a short term
contractionary monetary policy. This contractionary monetary policy reduces inflation
which means the cost of keeping cash decreases (more strictly speaking, it is benefit of
keeping cash increases because it would be deflation around optimal policy). This means
the cost of keeping cash to buy capital decreases and the demand of capital increases. As
we have discussed in last section, price of capital increases and the benefit of keeping cash
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Figure 6: Effects of financial shock and optimal monetary policy
for the borrowers increases because a unit of capital can secure more debts. It offsets
the trends of decreasing capital held by borrowers and recession is eliminated. Both
lenders and borrowers will consume the same amount of goods as before with the optimal
monetary policy.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how monetary policy works when financial market is incom-
plete. We find that financial frictions such as collateral constraints can misallocate social
resource both in long run and short run. At the same time, monetary policy have a strong
redistribution effect through reducing cost of purchasing capital. Monetary policy plays
a significant role in helping the economy and increasing social welfare if there is ineffi -
ciency caused by distortion of resource. Failing to take this redistribution channel into
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consideration monetary policy may not achieve the goal expected by policy maker. Thus,
different countries should set different aim of inflation rate in the long run according to
their financial system. There is no certain best inflation rate for every country. When
government want to reduce business cycles by business cycles, they must also understand
what property of the business cycle is since monetary is much more effective to deal with
financial shock than TFP shock.
Though our model is very simple, it does provide a way to understand monetary
policy which can be used in every heterogeneous agents literature with money. The way
we find the optimal monetary policy can be valid in literatures about heterogeneity and
money. The channel of monetary policy works through we discuss worth consideration in
other heterogeneous models.
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CHAPTER 4. BLOCKCHAIN INNOVATION IN GLOBAL PAYMENTS:
NETWORK EFFECTS, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND BUBBLES
4.1 Introduction
The global payments industry is large and plays an important role in world econ-
omy. According to Niederkorn etal. (2016), global payments industry generated $1.8
trillion in revenue in 2015 and it is estimated to generate $2.2 trillion in revenue in 2020.
Cross-border payments comprised about 40 percent of total global payments transac-
tional revenues (i.e., transaction-related fees and float income) while they accounted for
less than 20 percent of total payments volumes. Cross-border payments generated $300
billion in global revenue. However, global payments, especially cross border payments,
are costly and ineffi ciency. According to the Remittance Prices Worldwide Report of the
World Bank (2017), the global average cost for sending USD 500 was 4.56 percent in Q4
2017. While the internet has facilitated and reduced the costs of international communi-
cations enormously, the speed of sending remittance cross-border remains very slow and
may often take two days or longer. For example, it takes less than 14 hours to fly from
New York to Beijing which means that it is faster to take cash by plane from New York
to Beijing than to use traditional remittance methods.
Recent technological advances have shown potential to disrupt, or significantly al-
ter the global payment system that has been characterized by sluggish technological
progress. Financial institutions and fintech companies started to use blockchain technol-
ogy. Blockchain uses cryptography and information technology to record data in open
and distributed ledgers that could significantly increase the security and effi ciency of in-
formation transfer and transactions. The basic concept of blockchain was first described
in early 1990s (Haber and Stornetta, 1991) but there is no big progress and real product
until Nakamoto wrote his paper (Nakamoto, 2008) and developed Bitcoin in 2009. Bitcoin
relative success have stimulated a myriad of copycats but also new products. Although
many blockchain products may not have any real potential, others may do. If successful,
blockchain technologies could reshape the global payments system.
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A fintech company, Ripple, was the first to utilize blockchain technology with the pur-
pose of reducing cost and increase effi ciency of the payment industry. Founded in 2012,
Ripple developed a protocol capable of making cross-border and cross-currency transac-
tion in less than four seconds. The transaction costs can be extreme small. According to
a report by Ripple itself (2016), Ripple can cut bank’s global settlement costs up to sixty
percent. There have been an increasing number of financial institutions working with
Ripple. Among them are many well known brands such as American Express, Western
Union, Moneygram, UBS, Santander, CIBC, BBVA, UniCredit and Standard Chartered
based on Ripple’s offi cial website. Besides Ripple, there are several competitors seek-
ing to use blockchain technology in the global payments system. R3, for example, is a
company leading a consortium of more than 80 big banks and has its own distributed
ledger/blockchain platform Corda. The incumbent giant for global payments is SWIFT,
an institution founded in 1973 and currently linking more than 11000 financial institu-
tions worldwide. SWIFT is also embracing blockchain technology by developing SWIFT
GPI. It reports that nearly 50% of payments can be credited to end beneficiaries in less
than 30 minutes (SWIFT 2018). These examples show that industry insiders consider
blockchain technologies as serious alternatives with the potential to reshape the global
payments industry.
To gain some idea about the degree of ongoing technological progress, consider the
following. Currently Bitcoin may take more than sixteen hours to finish one transaction
and the cost per transaction can be as high as $55 due to the costly "mining" process. To-
day, Ripple only need less than four seconds with extreme small transaction cost, usually
far less than one cent according to XRP charts which is offi cial live and historical data
website about Ripple network. Since blockchain technologies are still in an early stage of
development and adoption, there is still significant room for technological progress and
adoption. As time goes on, it is possible that more competitors providing new solutions
for global payments will arise. What is the future of the global payment industry given
the disruptive nature of technological progress occuring? Will the traditional technology
be displaced, or could the incumbent retain its market share by adopting new blockchain
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technologies such as SWIFT GPI? Or other leaders such as Ripple and R3 will grow to
attract more financial institutions into their network? Or a new leader will emerge with
a new technology?
Technological innovations, particularly disruptive ones, often correlate with specula-
tive bubbles (Shiller 2000). Many economists believe there are bubbles in blockchain
industry. For example, the price of a Bitcoin was just $0.06 in July 19th, 2010, $6.18 on
January 2nd, 2012, and more than $19000 on December 16th, 2017. At the same time,
Bitcoin is not widely used. Except some black market use case, there are very few trans-
actions using Bitcoin. Many economists believe the intrinsic value of Bitcoin is much less
than it is now so the price of Bitcoin is bubble. Bitcoin is not the exception. We have
already seen thousands of blockchain technologies and more than 1500 cryptocurrencies
in the market. Most of cryptocurrencies do not have a real world use now and they do
not have clear roadmap or business plan to be used in the near future. However, the all
time high market cap for cryptocurrencies up to now is 813 billion while the maximum
of trade volume in exchange in 24 hours is 44 billion according to coinmarketcap.com.
These suggest that many cryptocurrencies have few chance to succeed in business traded
in high prices, much higher than their intrinsic value. This is what economists define as
bubbles. For example, Dogecoin, a copycat of Bitcoin, has attracted a large number of
speculators though the developers themselves did not regarded it as a serious project.
Dogecoin has not been updated since 2015 which makes its technology lags far behind,
with little if any business use and not much potential. However, its market cap increased
from less than 1.5 million USD in 2015 to 2 billion USD on January 7th, 2018. Though
it is diffi cult to conclude that cryptocurrencies are bubbles, there is still a sense that
some cryptocurrencies, such as Dogecoin, are. We investigate what effects bubbles have
on technological progress in global payments. Do they stimulate technological progress
or do they generate a net loss to society?
This paper builds a theoretical model to shed light on some of these questions. To
reflect a key characteristic of global payments and blockchain technology, this paper
uses the economic concept of a network effect. A network effect is the positive effect
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that an additional user of a product has on the value of that product to others. The
value of the product depends on how many users there are. Both global payments and
blockchain technology have a clear network effect. When a financial institution uses a
product for international payments, it has to cooperate with other financial institutions
directly or indirectly. Thus the more financial institutions there are, the more convenient
the payment is. Blockchain technologies also show network effects. They need more
participants to record transactions on ledgers. If there are very few participants, the
cost for participants to falsify data is low. In an extreme case, if an recorder has more
than 50% share of recording power, every claim it made will be accepted as truth in the
blockchain network. Even though no one has that big power, It is relatively easy for the
recorder to claim transactions which do not exist if it is a big enough recorder thus there
is security problem. An increasing number of recorder can significantly reduce such risk.
There are two sectors in our model: an R&D sector and financial institutions. Every
period inventors in the R&D sector have a chance to discover a new better technology and
optimally choose whether or not to develop it into a real network product that can be used
by financial institutions. Financial institutions choose whether or not to join a network
within their information set. Information about the set of available products is imperfect
and diffuses slowly. The more financial institutions there are in one network, the more
effi cient it is. The slow diffusion of information plays an important role. If information
diffuses instantly the solution is trivial. All financial institutions join the leading network
and abandon older networks at the same time. In this case, network effects need not to
be considered. When there is imperfect diffusion of information, there is heterogeneity
among financial institutions and network effects play key role. Thus we find diffusion of
information is important when considering network effect and technological progress.
In our basic model technological progress is exogenous but its adoption is endogenous.
We characterize the dynamics of technological progress as a three stage process. In the
first stage, the state of the "blockchain" technology is not advanced enough so that new
discoveries are not developed into real network projects and financial institutions use the
traditional technology. A second stage of "creative destruction" starts when the level
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of knowledge is suffi ciently large. Inventors in the R&D sector find that some of their
products can attract a critical mass of financial institutions, enough to compensate for the
costs of developing a new network. This Schumpeterian process of "creative destruction"
continues as some new technologies develop into real projects and some old technologies
lose their market share. In the end, one or more blockchain networks are both advanced
enough and big enough so their market share never fall. This is the third stage and we
call it formation of oligarch.
Then we extend our model to allow for endogenous technological progress requiring a
research cost. We find that unless the initial level of knowledge is large enough as to allow
initial innovations to break even, blockchain technologies will not be developed. Direct
government R&D investments could bring the frontier of knowledge to the required critical
level. Another alternative that could help ignite innovation are bubbles. Bubbles make
technological progress possible since even projects with no chance to be used by financial
institutions could still get enough return for technological progress to occur. This is in
fact consistent with the recent history of blockchain technology. Although basic concepts
have existed for a while, technological progress was very slow and there was no major
progress until Bitcoin came along. Many regard Bitcoin price to be fundamentally a
speculative bubble. But this bubble has ignited an innovation frenzy and several years
after that there are thousands of new products of blockchain technology. According to
our model, bubbles can help technological progress but they may also encourage excessive
development of networks that have no chance of business success, which decreases social
welfare. Thus, bubbles may increase or decrease social welfare depending on the dominant
effect.
There is a large literature on network effects. Primary concerns of this literature is the
notion critical mass and the dynamics and stableness of critical mass (Jackson and Yariv
2007). Many papers focus on price theory and competition in two-side or multi-sided
platforms (Indirect network effect) such as Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006)
and Weyl(2010). Some papers discuss technology adoption and innovation. One topic is
adoption of technology such as Kazt and Shapiro(1986). There are very few papers about
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R&D or introducing new technologies with network effects. Kristiansen (1998) studies
a two firms two buyers three stages game. Shy (1996) uses an OLG model to study
the demand of a durable product which has network effects and technological progress.
However, every generation is trapped in the sense that it has to use a certain good and
cannot switch as the generation gets older. Moreover, there are at most two products
existing at the same time and the share of them totally depends on the population of
each generation. Thus, technology progress occurs only as new generations arrive. This
mechanism cannot really account for the fast and disruptive nature of progress observed
in many industries with network effects. Similar to the papers just mentioned, our model
has the adaption of new technology and the concept of critical mass. At the same time, our
paper contributes to the understanding of the dynamic process of technological progress
with network effects.
Our paper also relates to the blockchain literature. Though this topic is popular in
public media and engineering fields, there are still not many studies in economics. Nu-
merous papers discuss Bitcoin’s technology, its potential use, risk and governance issues
(Bohme, Christin, Edelman, Moore 2015, Davidson, De Filippi, Potts 2016, Catalini and
Gans 2016) but without solid theoretical basis. Among the few economic papers with solid
foundations are: Cong and He (2018) who study how smart contract using blockchain
technology can affect competition; and Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) who study the effect
if central government chooses to issue digital currencies as a second legal tender. How-
ever, to the extent of our knowledge, there is no paper focusing on global payments and
there is no paper discussing network effect of blockchain technology in a theoretical way.
Finally, our paper relates to the literatures on bubbles. There is a large literature of
the relationship between investment and bubbles. For example, Farhi and Tirole (2012)
study under which conditions bubbles are more likely to emerge and they also find that
bubbles crowd investment in (out) when liquidity is abundant (scarce). Hirano and
Yanagawa (2017) study the relationship between asset bubbles and endogenous growth
and they also find that bubbles have crowd in and crowd out effects on investment and
growth. Different with their models, our model is a partial equilibrium model for one
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certain industry. However, in our extension, we still find bubbles have crowd in effect to
increase the investment and technological progress in blockchain technology use in global
payment industry.
In section 2, we describe our basic model in detail and the results are given in section
3. We extend the basic model in section 4 and section 5 is the conclusion.
4.2 The Basic Model
4.2.1 Timeline
As we mention in introduction,there are two kinds of agents in our basic model: inven-
tors (R&D sector) and financial institutions. Inventors find and develop new technologies
which can help reduce payments cost while financial institutions pay license fee to use
inventors’blockchain network to do global payments. Before we describe inventors’and
financial institutions’behavior in detail, we first describe the timeline of one period to
help understand the model.
Figure 1: Timeline
As the Figure 1 shows, inventors act first and then financial institutions act. From
the beginning of a period, nature decides if inventors find an new idea of blockchain
technology and which inventor finds the idea. If there is new idea, the inventor who
finds the idea decides whether to develops it into a real product. After that come the
financial institutions. They first search for new network (products) they do not know
before. Financial institutions have heterogeneous knowledge. Then they decide if they
want to pay license fee to join some networks they know but have not joined before. If
they join it they do not have to use it immediately but have the right to use it from then
on. In the last step financial institutions operate to use networks which can help them to
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get most profit this period to do payments. After that this period ends and a new period
begins.
4.2.2 R&D Sector
We assume there are many potential inventors who can invent new blockchain tech-
nologies to reduce transaction cost of global payments. Here the cost contains both money
cost and time cost. In the beginning (t = 0), there is no blockchain technology for global
payments and the only technology being used by all financial institutions is traditional
technology. At the beginning of the first period, t = 1, one of the inventors has the idea
of first blockchain technology. After that, every period there is probability π that another
person finds an idea better than the best idea before. In the basic model, we assume only
doing scientific research to find a new idea is costless. Later we will extend our model




If an inventor has an idea j at time t (j), he has to decide whether he wants to develop
it into a real project which can be used and paid by financial institutions. If he decides
not to develop it, he publishes his idea and other inventors can use it as reference to make
progress and have better idea. If he decides to develop it, he has to pay R&D cost which
is c. The inventor also has to decide the license fee τ j he wants financial institutions
to pay. If a financial institution chooses to pay the license fee, it can use the network
anytime it wants to use after that. mj,t =
∫
1i,j,tdi is the measure of financial institutions
pay the license fee and join the blockchain j at time t where 1i,j,t is an indicator function.
The indicator function is 1 when financial institution i decides to join j blockchain at




β is the discount rate. If the inventor decides to develop a project, his expected profit is





Since there are many inventors we assume it is a monopolistic competitive market.
Other inventors can imitate its project and provides similar product. To prevent com-
petitor from entering the market, the inventor must set license fee to make
Et(j)Πj = Et(j)τ j
∞∑
t=t(j)
βt−t(j)mj,t − c = 0 (1)
The inventor chooses to develop it only when he can set τ j to make expected profit be
zero and chooses not to develop it when it is impossible to find such license fee. We use
indicator Υj to denote if there is τ j to satisfy (1). Υj = 1 if there exists such τ j, otherwise





 = 0 (2)
4.2.3 Financial Institutions
There are a continuum of financial institutions i ∈ [0, 1]. An institution does three
steps every period. The financial institution first tries to search if there are potential
new blockchain networks. They have the probability δ > 0 to find the true value and
usage of a certain blockchain network every period and before that they cannot join it.
δ is the parameter of diffusion of information. As we discuss in introduction, δ is the key
to generate network effect. If δ = 1, all financial institutions have the same information
and they will use and give up using a certain blockchain network at the same time so
the network effect does not matter very much. If δ < 1, network effect affects the choice.
The smaller the δ is, the greater the information heterogeneity is. And the increasing
of heterogeneity increases the role of network effect. We use Ωi,t to denote the network
financial institution i knows at the first step of period t. We assume which network a
financial institution has known and joined is public information. We use Θt to denote
the public information.
After that, financial institution decides whether or not to join this blockchain network.
It costs τ j to join the blockchain and it can use this blockchain network to send remittance
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any time it wants after joining it. If it refuses to join the network, it still has chance to
join every period in the second step. We use Ji,t to denote the set of feasible technology
for financial institution i at period t. If i has joined blockchain network j then j ∈ Ji,t.
Otherwise j /∈ Ji,t. We use Γ(Ji,t, Ji,t−1) to denote the total license fee financial institution
i has to pay when their feasible set of technologies changes from Ji,t−1 to Ji,t.
The third step is to operate their normal business. For simplicity, we assume the
revenue for an institution is always the same as R. A financial institution chooses tra-
ditional technology or any blockchain networks they have already joined to do payment.
For simplicity, we assume the cost of traditional technology is fixed as ε. The cost of






where Sj,t is the measure of institutions which have al-
ready joined blockchain j at time t. Sj,t =
∑t
l=t(j)mj,l. Function g(.) satisfy properties
g1 < 0, g2 < 0 . g11 ≥ 0, g22 ≥ 0, lim g1(A, .) → 0, lim g2(., 1) → 0. It is very intuitive.
It is trivial to assume a certain technology which is more advanced has lower cost. The
second property comes from network effects. If there are very few institutions join a
blockchain network, it is very inconvenient to use it to send remittance so it is ineffi cient
and cost financial institutions more. The more institutions there are, the more effi ciency
there are. Although better technology and more participants do reduce cost, their mar-
ginal effect is decreasing. When technology has already reduce the transaction time to
less than one second, new technology which is able to reduce more time cannot reduce
much more cost. If there have already been 90% financial institutions using the network,













and financial institution problem in step 3 is













If we combine all the three steps, we can write the following Bellman equation to
indicate financial institution i’s choice in period t.


















Given the description of R&D sector and financial institutions, we can define the
equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the model is given information set {Ωi,t,Θt}, prices {τ j},
indicators {Υj}, accessible network set {Ji,t}, measure of joining network at certain time
{mj,t} and measure of joining network in total {Sj,t} solve inventors’ problem (2) and
financial institutions’problem (3).
4.3 Result of the Basic Model
Before we come to the main propositions of this paper. We first set a lower bound
of τ j. An inventor never develops an idea unless he can at least get zero profit. To





which means he does not get negative profit in the best situation in which all financial




We first show that there exists some technology which is not advanced enough so
inventors do not invest to develop them into products. Thus blockchain technology cannot
replace traditional technology in the early stage.





1− lnA g−1S=1 (ε− (1− β) τmin)
it will never be developed into a real project. Here g−1S=1 (.) is the inverse function of g
given S = 1.
Proof. If the inventor develops idea j they have to set price τ j ≥ τmin . If financial
institutions choose to join the blockchain j, they pay τ j. The benefit of using the tech-



























< τmin. Even all institutions join the network and use it for-
ever the revenue is still less than the possible lowest license fee τmin. Thus, no one wants
to join the blockchain and the inventor cannot get revenue to satisfy (1).
This proposition is a suffi cient condition, though not necessary condition, to show that
there is some blockchain technology are not useful for global payments. Any blockchain
technology like this will cause net wealth loss for the whole economy if they are developed.
In an economy without bubble, no one wants to develop them into projects.
We then show the existence of ideas developed into projects and adopted by some
financial institutions.
Proposition 3 There is at least one idea which have been developed by inventors and
adapted by some financial institutions before or when idea j# is invented while idea j# is




































t−t(j) (1− π)t−t(j) δ (1− δ)t−t(j)
 = c
Proof. Assume there is no idea has been developed and adapted before. When idea j#
appears, if the inventor decides to develop it and set the license fee as τ ∗, the expected
benefit for financial institutions which have found its true value at the moment when it















so they certainly join the blockchain. Here the right hand side of first inequility is only
the part of expected cost saving to calculate the situation when there is no new idea
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exsits. Thus total expected benefit for financial institutions must be greater than this
one. That’s the logic behind the first inequility. And the expected revenue of inventor is
Et(j)Ri > τ
∗








t−t(j) (1− π)t−t(j) δ (1− δ)t−t(j)
 = c
The inventor of j# then has positive profit to develop the idea so in fact he set the
license fee τ j# < τ ∗ to satisfy the zero profit condition. Then the profits for financial
institutions are even higher so they join the network. Thus, there is at least an idea has
been developed and adopted when idea j# is invented.
We have already found that there are blockchain technologies can be successful in
business. The next question is as technological progress new technologies may replace old
ones so is it possible that some technologies can reach a point that no potential competitor
has chance to attract their consumers? Next two propositions provide both suffi cient
condition for such blockchain networks and proof of the existence of such networks.







< g (A, 1) + (1− β) τmin
financial institutions in blockchain network j will never try any other blockchain networks.
Proof. We consider an extreme case all others not joining blockchain j before first
discover the best technology and join the best technology immediately after they find
it. Also, we assume first group of firms in blockchain j join the best blockchain imme-
diately, the inventors can get highest return in this case. The license fee τA still has
















− g (A, 1)
)
< τmin. Even this unrealistic low entry fee is still
greater than the cost saved by the best technology, financial institutions in blockchian j
never find it profitable to switch. Thus financial institutions in blockchain network j will
never try any other blockchain networks.
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Figure 2: Region that product will keep its market share
Figure 2 describes this suffi cient condition. Both market share and technology are
important. Given the technology, the bigger the market share the easier it is to reach
the suffi cient condition. Given the market share, the more advanced the technology the
easier it is to reach the suffi cient condition. This suffi cient condition shows that both
network effect and technology itself can help a blockchain network survive in the long
run.
Proposition 5 There is at least one blockchain technology that can maintain its share
and never collapses.







− g (A, S) < (1− β) ε. We assume there is no blockchain technology can
maintain its share before j∗, otherwise we have already found what we want to show.
If j∗ is good enough to be developed into an project and financial institutions think it
is profitable to join the network, it is never replaced by a better technology. Thus it is
a blockchain network which never collapses. If it is not good enough to be developed






− g (A, S) < ε, better technology
is not good enough either. Which means the past technology will not be replaced by
anything new so there must have already been one technology can survive forever.
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From propositions above, we understand how technological progress happens in global
payments industry with blockchain technology. It can be divided into three stages. The
first stage is early stage. Technology is not advanced enough in early stage so new
discoveries are not developed into real projects. That is the intuition proposition 1 tells
us. And this is very realistic and easy to understand. Traditional technology is more
competitive when new technology is at the early stage.
However, it is not the end of the story. Technological progress happens and blockchain
technology is getting more and more effi cient so we come to the second stage which is
"creative destruction" stage. Technologies ultimately reach a threshold when the level
of knowledge is suffi ciently large. Above the threshold technologies have the chances
to be successful in business. But not all the technologies above the threshold can be
developed into real projects. Whether a certain technology is developed into a project
is determined by the existing networks and their market share. An existing project
may operate for some time but replaced by others and even those financial institutions
join it gradually abandon using it. We call this process "creative destruction" just as
Schumpeter suggested. However, these technology shall not be viewed as bubbles even
they may lose its market share soon because they have intrinsic value at least for some
time and have potential to reduce global payments cost and increase social welfare. That
is why financial institutions may want to pay to join it.
After this creative destruction process running for some time, there may be blockchain
networks which are advanced and big enough so no one can attract financial institutions
in this blockchain to pay license fee to switch to other blockchain. The whole global
payments market are gradually dominated by one or several such networks depending on
the realization of history. We call this third stage as formation of oligarch.
Figure 3 shows propositions and the technological process we discussed before. Propo-
sitions help us to characterize the whole process but they are only suffi cient conditions or
proof of existence rather than the thresholds itself. The process is too complicated so it
is impossible to give the analytical threshold of each stage. However, these propositions
are enough for us to understand the whole technological progress.
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Figure 3: Evolution history of the industry
3.4 Extension: Research Cost, Government Funding and Bubbles
4.4.1 Research Cost
In the basic model, we assume that new ideas come into inventors’mind for free.
Some people may think it is arbitrage to make such assumption. We know sometimes
even pure academic research needs funding. In reality, it may take inventors several years
to develop an preliminary idea which can be developed into a real business product. In
this section we extend our model to see what happens if inventors have to pay some cost
to even get an feasible idea. The technological progress in this section is endogenous
rather than a total exogenous process.
We assume the inventor who has an new idea pay research cost ζ to get the preliminary
result. Only with the preliminary result the idea can be developed into a real business
project though the inventor may not choose to develop it. At the same time new research
must stand on the preliminary result to find new idea. If the inventor choose not to do
any research to get the preliminary result, other inventors know nothing about this idea
and the economy behaves as if there is no such an idea. Technological progress still needs
first find this idea.
78
Cost ζ in this extension may be not big in this extension but even a very small ζ has
huge effect on the whole process. From proposition 2, when technology is not advanced
enough no one wants to adapt the technology thus inventors get nothing but only pay
the cost. If the initial idea is not profitable no one wants to pay the research cost ζ
and blockchain technology will stay at the lowest level forever. There is no technological
progress and blockchain technology never becomes useful. Also, when there has already
some technologies existed, the innovation process will stop if a new idea is not profitable
since the older ones have big share.
Though the intuition is very simple, it is just what happened before the invention of
Bitcoin. The basic concept exists but technological progress is very slow, if there is some
progress, that for almost twenty years there is no significant progress even in research.
One of the most important reason for this situation is very few people want to invest in
something that have almost zero return.
4.4.2 Government Funding
We know in many scientific research the private return is usually very small and the
cost may be large. To encourage researchers to do research which can benefit the social
welfare in the long term, governments devise some incentive system such as research
funding. These funding can compensate the cost in research so researchers are willing
to do research which the private return is less than the research cost. In our model, if
a government funds an inventor ζ when an inventor publish his idea j then the process
is just the same as the basic model and the total social welfare is ζj less than the basic
model when idea j is found. Since we assume ζ is small, the total welfare loss is also
small. In this ideal world, the problem is easy to solve with a small social cost.
However, we find it is not that easy to have a government working like that. For
some new born technology, it is hard for governments to fully understand the value of the
technology thus they may not choose to fund research in this field. As we have discussed,
for nearly 20 years, few people understood the value of blockchain so it is impossible for
governments to fund research of blockchain technology.
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4.4.3 Bubbles
In reality, rapid technological progress happens right after the increasing price of
Bitcoin. After Bitcoin is developed and attract some people’s interest, the price of Bitcoin
explodes. According to coindesk.com, in July 19, 2010, price of Bitcoin was just $0.06.
In less than one year and a half, price was $6.18 on Jan 2, 2012. The price rose more
than 100 times. After that, we see huge amount of new blockchain technology have been
developed in several years, including all of the most important blockchain technology for
global payments such as Ripple, R3 and SWIFT GPI. In this process, we have already
seen thousands of blockchain technology and more than 1500 cryptocurrencies in the
market. As we have discussed in introduction, clearly many cryptocurrencies are traded
at prices which are much more than their intrinsic value. Those cryptocurrencies with
prices much higher than their intrinsic value are bubbles. Most economists view bubbles
as bad things which will harm financial systems and even whole economy badly. However,
in this section, we use our model with research cost and bubbles to show that bubbles
may help the process of R&D.
We assume in this model if the first blockchain technology is developed, no matter it is
a successful business project or not, it attracts some attention and get extra return from
third party besides license fee from financial institutions. Since the fundamental value of
an technology is the cost financial institutions reduce and some of the welfare reallocates
to inventors through license fee, the extra return is not related to fundamental value of a
technology thus it can be viewed as bubbles. For simplicity, we assume every project has
same bubble bt at period t. We assume every period bubbles grow as the rate as η with
probability ι. Here we have ηβ > 1. There is probability 1− ι that bubbles burst so the
value of bubbles come to zero. This bursting bubble model is nothing new and it is first
used by Blanchard (1979).
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Now we can find that the expected profit of research to find an idea and develops it
into a project becomes
Et(j)Π = Et(j)τ j
∞∑
t=t(j)
βt−t(j)mj,t +Bj − c− ζ
where Bj = bt(j)+
∑∞
t=t(j)+1 (βι)
t−t(j) ηt−t(j)−1 (η − 1) bt(j) is inventor j’s expected revenue
from bubbles. if Bj ≥ c+ ζ, inventor j always chooses to pay research cost and develops
it into a real projects regardless of how many financial institutions choosing to join.
This extension of model does not affect the result of proposition 4 and proposition 5.
It does change proposition 2 and proposition 3 because every new idea will be developed
into real projects. However, there are many projects no financial institution will use.
Thus, bubbles have two effects. The first effect is positive and is a kind of crowd
in effect. As we have seen, bubbles encourages R&D. This is just what happens in
blockchain technology. Very few people pay attention to blockchain technology for nearly
two decades but many inventors trying to develop new projects when there are bubbles
in cryptocurriencies because they can get high return from bubbles. The technological
progress begins until one day some projects which can change the global payments come
into life and the social welfare increases.
However, bubbles also have negative effect. Many projects which are developed when
there are bubbles are not profitable at all. If the project cannot attract enough financial
institutions so Et(j)τ j
∑∞
t=t(j) β
t−t(j)mj,t− c < 0 for any reasonable τ j, the optimal choice
for the whole society is just finding the idea but not developing it into a project. However,
with Bj ≥ c+ ζ, inventor has incentive to develops it thus it is a welfare loss.
Thus the effects of bubbles are ambiguous. On the one hand it increases social welfare
by encouraging technological progress, on the other hand it helps some projects which
have no use and cause a deadweight loss. We have to decide which effect is dominant.
According to data in our introduction, global payments industry is big and so is the
cost. Since now we have already had product can reduce 60% of the cost we believe the
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positive effect is the dominant effect thus bubbles in blockchain technology increase the
social welfare.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the evolution of blockchain technology in global payments
industry theoretically. We find that technological progress and network effect both play
significantly role. Generally speaking, the industry meets three stages, at the first stage
technologies is not advanced enough and technologies cannot have business success. At
the second stages, technologies are able to help reducing cost of global payments. Better
technology can replace old ones although network effect give current leaders some advan-
tages but it is not enough to compensate the technological weakness. At the final stage,
some advanced technology with big network effect are unbeatable so one monopolist or
several oligarchs dominate the industry.
We also find that technological progress can be slowed down for a long time even if
research costs are small. Government funding can solve this problem but it maybe diffi cult
for the government to understand the value of new technologies particularly at the very
early stage. For example, governments did not choose to fund blockchain technologies
when the technology was new but there is a growing interest by central banks to do so.
An alternative way to solve the problem are bubbles, which is consistent with the
actual evolution of the blockchain industry. Bubbles attract speculator’s attention and
developers can get high return to compensate the R&D cost, sparking thus a wave of
innovation. Bubbles have both positive effect to encourage technological progress but
also have negative effects because they misallocate some resource to some technology
which never have chance to succeed in business. Since the global payments industry is
big, the positive effect is likely more important and blockchain technology could increase
social welfare by reducing cost of global payments.
Although our paper focus on global payments and blockchain technology, the basic
model can be used in many other fields with dynamic network effects such as the Internet.
To the extent of our knowledge, our paper is the first to characterize the dynamic evolution
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of an industry characterized by endogeneous technological progress and network effects.
In this model, we find the diffusion of information plays an key role in discussing network
effect. For simplicity we assume the speed of diffusion is a fixed parameter. Introducing
a more complicated diffusion of information process, as it is done in a related network
literature, will allow the model to account for other type of adoption strategies. Our
R&D sector is also very simple but allow us to create a bridge between growth models
and network effects. This paper also makes an contribution on the role of bubbles for
innovation. Bubbles have played a role in at early stages in different industries, as it
seems to be the case with blockchain technologies. For example, internet industry in the
late 1990s and early 2000s had dotcom bubbles. Although many companies disappeared
after the burst of bubbles, some now well known companies such as Google, were born
during that period. Our mechanism provides a new channel to discuss bubbles in new
born industries. Bubbles attract funding which can encourage technological progress.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In my dissertation. I find that financial frictions hurt economy no matter for the
whole economy or a certain industry. However, chapter 2 finds that monetary policy can
be used to reduce financial frictions. Although traditional views on bubbles are bubbles
are bad for economy, both chapter 3 and chapter 4 of my dissertation find that bubbles
may be good when there are financial frictions especially in R&D sector.
In the future, I want to build some models which are more related with real data
to study the effects of financial frictions. All the three chapters I in this dissertation
are theoretical work. They provide interesting mechanism and intuition to explain how
financial frictions affect on the economy and how different policy can be used to offset their
negative effects. However, it is very important to do some empirical studies before these
mechanism and intuition are used by policy maker. Thus, models provide theoretical
background for empirical research are needed.
85
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 6






t +Bt. We have
atK
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(1− θ) rtKjt + (1− θ) qt (1− δ)Kjt















By taking first order derivative of Kjt+1 we have qt = ρt+1at+1. By comparing the left
hand side and right hand side we get
at = (1− θ) rt + (1− θ) qt (1− δ) + (1− θ) π (qt − 1)
[
rt + ρt+1at+1ξ (1− δ)
]
+ θa#t
Bt = (1− θ) [1 + π (qt − 1)] ρt+1Bt+1
which are the proposition.
A.2 Derivation of Reallocation Effects Model
A.2.1 Households












A.2.2 Final Goods Producer






1−σdn, 0 < σ < 1
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subject to the production function. It is easy to solve profit maximization problem and
we have the demand function for intermediate goods n











A.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
Producer of Intermediate good n has profit
(P nt − 1)Xnt = σA (Xnt )
σ (LYt )
1−σ −Xnt
Since we have already had intermediate goods n’s demand function, we can find the price




















. Since we know that it is competitive monopolistic market, the discounted total profits





















if s 6= t, ρ (s, t) = 1 if s = t. Since only variables in ηn













1−σLYt = ηn = ηt (2)
A.2.4 R&D Sector
Same as baseline model.
A.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is defined as allocations
{
Yt, Kt, Ct, It, Nt, E
j



























such that household maximize its utility and firms in all three
sectors maximize their profits and market clearing conditions are satisfied which are stock

















Xnt dn+It = Yt and the amount of patent follows Nt+1 = Nt+Tt.
A.2.6 Detrended Dynamic System






























Figure 1: Burst of stochastic bubbles in reallocation effects model
at = rt + qt (1− δ) + π (qt − 1)
(
rt + ρt+1at+1ξ (1− δ)
)
qt = ρt+1at+1








(1 + gNt+1)kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + πrtkt + πρt+1
[
at+1 (ξ (1− δ)) kt + (1 + gNt+1)bt+1
]











ct +Xt + πrtkt + πρt+1
[




wt = (1− σ)A (Xt)σ (LYt )−σ
A.2.7 Stochastic Bubbles Burst
We also study the case when bubbles burst stochastically. The setting is similar with
stochastic bubbles in baseline model. We only report the simulation result here in figure
1. Just as the relationship between stochastic burst and unanticipated burst in baseline
model, the pattern of stochastic burst and unanticipated burst are similar. The intuition
is also similar with intuition we discuss before.
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APPENDIX B. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Derivation of F.O.Cs




+ (1− η)qt(ki,t − ki,t−1) + (1− ζ)ci,t = eAtf(ki,t−1) + bi,t

















Atf(ki,t−1) + bi,t −mi,t −
Rtbi,t−1
(1 + πt)













− λi,t = 0 (4)








(ki,t) + βiλi,t+1(1− η)qt+1 = 0 (6)








1(c1t+1) (1 + rt+1)
ζRt+1 + 1− ζ
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(k1,t) + (1− η)qt+1]
ζRt+1 + 1− ζ
For the borrowers, substitute (4) into (3)
u
′
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t=0 β
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iλi,t[f(ki,t−1) + bi,t −mi,t −
Rtbi,t−1
1 + πt








− λi,t = 0 (9)




ki,t : −Ωi,tηqt−λi,t(1−η)qt+βiΩi,t+1ηqt+1 +βiλi,t+1f
′
(ki,t)+βiλi,t+1(1−η)qt+1 = 0 (11)








1(c1t+1) (1 + rt+1)
ζRt+1 + 1− ζ
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(13)
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(k2,t) + (1− η)qt+1
ζRt+1 + 1− ζ
(15)
Substitute (12) into (13)
qt
ηRt + 1− η
1 + rt+1
= Rt+1ηqt+1 + e
At+1f
′
(k1,t) + (1− η)qt+1 (16)
By using the same method, we can easily have
qt
ηRt + 1− η
1 + rt+1
= Rt+1ηqt+1 + e
At+1f
′
(k2,t) + (1− η)qt+1 (17)
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ζRt+1 + 1− ζ
There is no steady state. However there is an asymptotic steady state given a fixed























> 1 while β2
R
1+π
< 1. c1t → f(k1) + f(k2) and c2t → 0.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
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2(c2t) = ζΩ2,t + (1− ζ)β2Ω2,t+1
1
1 + πt+1
(1− η)qt(ki,t − ki,t−1) + (1− ζ)ci,t +mi,t +
Rtbi,t−1
1 + πt
= f(ki,t−1) + bi,t
Rt+1b2,t ≤ γqt+1(1 + πt+1)k2,t
b2,t = −nb1,t
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K = nk1,t + k2,t
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b1t : κ1,t − β1κ1,t
Rt+1
(1 + πt+1)
+ ξtn = 0
b2t : κ2,t − β1κ2,t+1
Rt+1
(1 + πt+1)
− νt+1Rt+1 + ξt = 0
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Find F.O.Cs and study the steady state,








q : λ[−Ω2η − β2Ω2
1
1 + π












−β1η − β1β2(1− η) + β2 (β1γ + η(1 + π)) + β22(1− η − γ) = 0
which means
1 + π =
β2 (γ + η − 1)
η
B.5 Model without Redistribution of Cash
If we want to check whether it is the redistribution of money which lead to the most
effect in our paper, we can change several settings of our model and get a model without
any redistribution effect of cash. The first change is cash in advance constraints. We
have new cash in advance constraints here






The difference between this one and the old one is we allow different types of households
get different money transfer from government.
97
When in the government part, monetary policy now change from the original one to
Mt = Mt−1(1 +mut) = Mt−1 + nt1,t + t2,t
t1,t = (1 + µt) ∗m1,t−1
Following the same method, we can easily find that the optimal monetary policy at
steady state is still 1 + π = β2(γ+η−1)
η
.
We can compare the monetary policy in short term with the model in our paper. The
red line is for original model and the green line is for model without redistribution of
money. We can see it is close with each others which means the redistribution of money
is not important and the redistribution through inflation and cost dominates.
Figure 2: Comparison of two models
